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 “In Russia’s Fields” 
Joel R. Moore 
 
 
In Russia’s fields no poppies grow 
There are no crosses row on row 
To mark the places where they lie, 
No larks so [gaily] singing fly 
 As in the fields of Flanders. 
 
We are the dead. Not long ago 
We fought beside you in the snow 
And gave our lives, and here we lie 
Though scarcely knowing reason why 
 Like those who died in Flanders. 
 
At Ust Padenga where we fell 
On Railroad, Kodish, shot and shell 
We faced, from just as fierce a foe 
As those who sleep where poppies grow, 
 Our comrades brave in Flanders. 
 
In Toulgas woods we scattered sleep, 
Chekuevo aid Kitsa’s tangles creep 
Across our [lonely] graves. At night 
The doleful screech owl’s dismal flight 
 Heart-breaking screams in Russia. 
 
Near Railroad bridge at Four-five-eight, 
An Chamova’s woods, our bitter fate 
We met. We fell before the Reds 
Where wolves now howl above our heads 
 In far off lonely Russia. 
 
In Shegovari’s desperate flight, 
Vistavka’s siege and Seltso’s night, 
In Bolsheozerk’s hemmed-in wood, 
In Karpogor, till death we stood 
 Like they who died in Flanders. 
 
And, Comrades, as you gather far away 
In God’s own land on some bright day 
And think of us who died and rest 
Just tell our folks we did our best 
 In far off fields of Russia.1 
  
                                                
1 BHL: Joel Moore, “In Russia’s Fields by Joel R. Moore (undated)”, Michael J. Macalla Papers, 1. 
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Relevant Maps 
 
I: Map of Northern Russia, 1918, outlining key points during the intervention2 
                                                
2 Rhodes, xiii; Place names have been edited (not in quotes, though) to match the spelling on these maps. 
3 
II: Southern-Archangel Area, Winter 1918, showing locations of American forces3 
                                                
3 Rhodes, xiv. 
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 217 
Map of the All ied Fronts in North Russia 
From page one of the Chicago Sunday Tribune Graphic Section, Feb. 26, 1939 
Shown at  http://home.comcast.net/~mvgrobbel/military/WWI/tragedyatarchangel.htm 
 
 III: Furthest Advance of Allied Forces4  
                                                
4 Guy Murchie, “Tragedy at Archangel!”, Chicago Daily Tribune, February 26, 1939, G1 in BHL: Primm, Tales, 217. 
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6 
Introduction 
 
France, November 11, 1918:  
The artillery kept it up until the last minute. So did the Boche [German] guns. But 
there seemed to be little hate in that morning’s barrage. The guns weren’t pointed 
anywhere in particular; they were just headed in the general direction of Germany and 
turned loose as fast as they could be fired […] As the hour approached, officers and men 
of the artillery gathered at the batteries, all eager to fire “the last shot of the war”. 
-Frank Sibley, Boston Globe Correspondent, 26th Division1 
 
Unfortunately for the men accompanying Sibley, their quest was in vain as “the last shot of the 
war” fired by a member of the American Expeditionary Force would not be until June 1919. On 
Armistice Day, crowds celebrated in the streets of major cities across Europe and America in a 
collective sigh of exhaustion and optimism. Thousands of American soldiers were travelling back 
from France to rejoin their families. The imminent reunions of Americans with their sons, 
brothers, and friends excited the country. In the heartland of America some families’ celebrations 
were muted. Over 5,000 American soldiers, mostly from the Detroit area, remained in North 
Russia for months after the war in Europe ended. The troops, formally known as the American 
Expeditionary Force, North Russia (AEFNR), fought the Bolshevik armies until the summer of 
1919 after the official end of hostilities in November 1918. The invasion of Archangel province by 
an amalgamation of Allied forces remains an unexplored occurrence in Western histories of World 
War I, and one that American officials seemed to forget. This forgotten war, never formally 
declared, led modern banker-turned-historian Robert L. Willett to dub the offensive a “sideshow” 
of the Great War.2  
Ignorance has surrounded the intervention in the American public sphere since the Cold 
War. Two American presidents, Richard Nixon in 1972 and Ronald Reagan in 1984, incorrectly 
claimed that the United States and the USSR had never fought each other in an armed conflict. A 
                                                
1 Frank P. Sibley, With the Yankee Division in France, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1919), 340-341 in James H. Hallas, Doughboy 
War: The American Expeditionary Force in World War I, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), 305. 
2 Robert L. Willett, Russian Sideshow: America’s Undeclared War, 1918-1920 (Washington D.C: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), Kindle. 
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1985 New York Times poll found that only 14% of Americans were aware that an intervention 
with American support had ever occurred in Russia.3 Unlike the Americans, Russian leaders never 
forgot the intervention. Nikita Khrushchev, while on a 1959 visit to the United States, erupted 
during a speech: “We remember the hard time after the October Revolution, U.S. troops led by 
their generals landed on Soviet soil […] to strangle our Revolution […] Our troops have never set 
foot on American soil, while your troops have set foot on Soviet soil”.4 An opportunity exists for 
further examination of this relatively unknown offensive in North Russia. This thesis focuses on 
the experience of those who fought, highlighting issues that can arise amongst soldiers when 
American intervenes in a foreign war. The examination places it within the developing soldier 
experience genre as a precursor for what became common in the twentieth century, as American 
soldiers found themselves in increasingly complex political situations on foreign soil. 
Longstanding interest in World War One has spurred countless books regarding the great 
battles, strategy, and complicated diplomacy of the conflict.5 However, a new genre of literature 
regarding the experience of American soldiers, spanning conflicts from the Civil War to Iraq, has 
emerged over the last few decades.6 Specific interest in the American soldier during World War 
One has appeared more recently, joining a longstanding British literary tradition that examines the 
experience fighting the Great War.7 Especially now, with the upcoming centennial of the 1918 
                                                
3 David Foglesong, America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: UNC Press, 1995), 7. 
4 “Khrushchev in America,” Internet Archive, accessed April 2, 2016, https://archive.org/details/khrushchevinamer006997mbp. 
5 For further reading, see: Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West, 
(London: Penguin Books, 2006); John Keegan, The First World War (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1998); William Philpott, War of 
Attrition: Fighting the First World War (New York: The Overlook Press, 2014); James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World 
War I, (New York: HarperCollins, 1981). 
6 The style and focus of this thesis was directly inspired by literature which focuses on the soldier’s combat experience in Vietnam, 
which emphasized the words of the soldiers by using primary sources and gleaned overarching themes. This thesis adopts a similar 
methodology and applying it to the conflict in North Russia, See: Christian G. Appy, American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and 
Our National Identity, (New York: Viking, 2015), Mark Baker, NAM: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Soldiers Who Fought 
There, (New York: Berkley, 1981); Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Eric M. Bergerud, Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam, 
(New York: Westview Press, 1993); John C. McManus, Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience, World War II 
through Iraq, (New York: Nal Caliber, 2010). 
7 James Hallas’ Doughboy War and David Snead’s An American Soldier in World War I are emblematic of the emerging soldier 
experience genre. As Snead and Hallas heavily quote primary materials written by American soldiers in Europe, the books allowed 
the thesis to compare and contrast the experience of the AEF and the AEFNR, See: George Browne, An American Soldier in World 
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Armistice, this thesis contributes to an ongoing reassessment of the Great War from new 
dimensions. More, this thesis contributes to the burgeoning literature arising from the centenary. 
 This study of the intervention in North Russia asks two questions: How was the 
intervention a case study of an American military mission that lacked a defined political purpose 
and what was the relationship of propaganda and domestic American media to the soldier 
experience? Bountiful archives allow such comprehensive analyses of the AEFNR experiences. 
 The Polar Bear Expedition Digital Collections make the scope of this thesis possible by 
providing detailed glimpses into the daily life experiences of the AEFNR. The archive consists of 
diaries, photographs, correspondences, poems, manifestos, interviews, scrapbooks, military 
pamphlets, Bolshevik propaganda, enlistment records, and maps collected from nearly 300 
soldiers and several American diplomatic officials.8 The collection offers an extensive source base 
totaling 2,304 digitized items, many of which are lengthy diaries, in 110 individual collections 
with more primary sources residing at the Bentley Library at the University of Michigan. This 
volume of material makes it “the largest collection of manuscript and print materials on the Polar 
Bear Expedition”.9 Many soldiers recorded daily events in journals and some wrote long reactions 
in a multitude of forms including reflections, poems, and essays. Correspondences illuminate key 
themes which the writer thought prominent enough to send back home. Scrapbooks provide an 
interesting medium as they reflect what the soldiers chose to remember in the press and if they 
followed events in Russia after returning home. Similarly, the objects soldiers brought home 
highlighted what the soldiers deemed important, such as Bolshevik propaganda and mementos like 
                                                                                                                                                          
War I, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010); James H. Hallas, Doughboy War: The American Expeditionary Force in 
World War I, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000). 
8 Notes on sourcing: Bentley materials are cited as: BHL: Author, “File Name in Collection”, Paper Collection Title, Page Number 
(Date, if possible). After the first source usage, author and file names will be abbreviated and Paper Collection will be dropped. 
Also, many footnotes contain multiple references. In these cases, the first source listed contains the quotation while the latter 
sources reinforce the claim. 
9 "Polar Bear Expedition Digital Collections," Polar Bear Expedition Digital Collections, accessed March 3, 2017, 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/polaread/. 
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Russian money. Enlistment records help classify soldiers by rank, nationality, and pre-war 
vocation. Lastly, photographs provide a visual aid to supplement the words of these soldiers. 
A small degree of imbalance is present in the Bentley materials. Officers’ records comprise 
a larger share of the archive than the actual ratio of officers to enlisted men would suggest. While 
no official numbers exist and estimates vary, the soldier to officer ratio was around 24 to 32 
enlisted men per officer, with 3 – 4% of the force consisting of officers.10 The Bentley archives, on 
the other hand, present a sample of 30% junior enlisted men, 19% NCOs, and 35% officers 
(Appendix B). Despite the overrepresentation of officer documents, enlisted men and non-
commissioned officers still encompass the majority of the archive. Various methodologies sought 
to minimize potential overuse of officer viewpoints. 
Research, sourcing, and writing tactics reduced imbalances in the archival collection to 
make it representative of the AEFNR experience. Diaries were given priority in the research 
process due to their relatively unbiased nature. Correspondences posed an issue. Many original 
copies of letters are emblazoned with an “Opened by Censor” tab and some had pieces removed. 
Even if the letters were not actually censored, soldiers were ordered not to write of the conditions 
in Russia and thus the subject matter of letters tends to be more trivial. As such, diaries were 
prioritized over letters. Letters sent after the war and free of censorship provide glimpses into the 
veteran experience. During the research process, I independently cataloged the Polar Bear 
Expedition Digital Collections to keep track of rank, company, contents subject matter, and media 
type to diversify sourcing. When quoting soldiers, concise and impactful writing was prioritized 
for stylistic reasons. Specific soldiers are sometimes used heavily to achieve narrative cohesion or 
illustrate themes through microhistory. 
                                                
10 BHL: Primm, 133; Charles Lewis, “War Diary”, Charles E. Lewis Papers, 82. 
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Several other primary sources provided additional details to support the Polar Bear 
Expedition Digital Collections. The National Archives hold the Historical Files of the American 
Expeditionary Force, North Russia, 1918-1919, which include official reports.11 These reports 
range from daily dispatches back to Washington, internal memos, casualty reports, Bolshevik 
strength estimates, and various reports on morale. The University of Michigan digitized issues of 
the newspaper published for the AEFNR in Archangel, The American Sentinel, and these papers 
detailed aspects of the soldier experience through military censorship.12 Lastly, several soldiers 
published literature after leaving Archangel. Many are included in the Bentley collections, yet 
notable exceptions include: Joel Moore, Harry Mead, and Lewis Jahns’ The History of the 
American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki Campaigning in North Russia 1918-1919 (1920),13 
John Cudahy’s anonymously published Archangel: The American War with Russia (1924),14 and 
Godfrey Anderson’s A Michigan Polar Bear Confronts the Bolsheviks: A War Memoir (2010).15 
While the secondary source base concerning the soldier experience in North Russia was not as 
extensive, the primary source scope makes such detailed study possible. 
Journalist E.M. Halliday’s16 The Ignorant Armies, first published in 1958 and revised in 
2001 under the title When Hell Froze Over, contains additional information from unobtainable 
primary sources. Halliday relied on interviews with veterans and thus offers alternative sourcing to 
the documents at Bentley. Halliday’s study verified themes in the Bentley sources and provided 
background information on the intervention. 
                                                
11 National Archives, “Historical Files of the American Expeditionary Force, North Russia, 1918-1919”, accessed March 2, 2017, 
https://www.fold3.com/title_483/us_expeditionary_force_north_russia#overview. 
12 American Red Cross, "The American Sentinel," Hathi Trust Digital Library, accessed January 28, 2017, 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003241550. 
13 Joel R. Moore, Harry H. Mead, Lewis E. Jahns, The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki: Campaigning 
in North Russia 1918-1919 (Detroit, MI: The Polar Bear Publishing Co., 1920). 
14 “A Chronicler” [John Cudahy], Archangel: The American War with Russia, (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1924), 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/miua.3931775.0001.001; John Cudahy had an established career after his experience in Russia, later 
serving as ambassador to Ireland, Poland, and Belgium. 
15 Godfrey J. Anderson, A Michigan Polar Bear Confronts the Bolsheviks: A War Memoir (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 2010). 
16 It is worth noting that Halliday is not a professional historian and made it clear in his introduction, writing that “this book is not 
intended as an academic work, and such paraphernalia as appendixes and exact source references are missing” in Halliday, Kindle 
Location 83/4001. 
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The need for further study of the Bentley collections and a lack of attention to the soldier 
experience in North Russia created an opportunity for this thesis. Most secondary sources were 
published during the Cold War as interest in the violence in North Russia and Siberia reemerged.17 
This literature outlined the diplomatic history of the expedition while themes illustrated by the 
soldiers on the ground received little coverage. Since the end of the Cold War, professional 
historians covered the subject less.18 Halliday noted that the “American Expedition to North 
Russia in 1918-1919 has been oddly neglected by professional historians”.19 Benjamin Rhodes, a 
professor at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater as of 1988, is the only academic historian to 
write about the soldier experience in North Russia, despite a detailed study by Robert Willett.20 
Ultimately, only these two secondary sources focused on the American soldier experience in North 
Russia in detail, presenting an opportunity for further examination. This thesis differentiates itself 
as it is structured around the Armistice, a critical turning point, and it places a new emphasis on 
the role of propaganda and news from the United States. 
Two secondary sources covering the intervention specifically, Willett’s Russian Sideshow: 
America’s Undeclared War (2003) and Rhodes’ The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia 
(1988), provided a foundation for this thesis. Rhodes described the soldier experience 
chronologically, starting with the pre-intervention situation among American diplomatic 
representatives in North Russia and continuing through the evacuation. He argued that, despite the 
small scale of the intervention, the soldier experience is worthy of study due to the military lessons 
                                                
17 See: Lloyd Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); Richard Goldhurst, The Midnight War: The American Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920, (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1978); George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene. Vol. 2. Soviet-American Relations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1958); John Swettenham, Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1919: And the Part Played by Canada, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967). 
18 There is evidence that interest in the Allied intervention in Russia may be reappearing along with the centennial of the Great 
War, as retired U.S. Army Col. John M. House recently published an examination of the American intervention in Siberia. Still, 
this book is a military history and does not explicitly focus on the soldier experience. See: John House, Wolfhounds and Polar 
Bears: The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1920 (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2016). 
19 E. M. Halliday, When Hell Froze Over: The Secret War between the U.S. and Russia at the Top of the World (New York, NY: 
iBooks, Inc., 2001), Kindle Location 61/4001, Kindle. 
20 Some academic historians (such as David Foglesong) have written about the intervention since, yet the books focus on the 
political side of the intervention, despite using some Bentley sources. 
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learned from the expedition.21 Rhodes concluded that the Allies did not learn these lessons. Willett 
examined the geopolitical situation leading up to the intervention and delved into the soldier 
experience in both Siberia and North Russia, dividing the chapters by front. Early on in the book, 
Willett stated his goal of detailing “the U.S. infantry, the doughboys, and how they fared,” and his 
book is largely a summary of these conditions.22 This thesis expands on Willett and Rhodes. It 
further utilizes the Bentley collections to continue their analyses, focusing on themes which led to 
declining American morale. Unlike Rhodes and Willett, this thesis argues that propaganda after 
the Armistice was a key component of deteriorating American confidence. 
 Several of the secondary sources covering the intervention in North Russia have used the 
Bentley collections, yet none utilized the collection to the same extent as this thesis. Willett, 
Rhodes, and Foglesong used the Bentley collections. Only Willett used the collections extensively 
while Rhodes and Foglesong favored other primary materials.23 The time since a secondary source 
last investigated the collection could also yield new discoveries. The Polar Bear Expedition 
Digital Collections were created in 1963 and digitized in 2004. In 2005, the archive underwent a 
next-generation revamp including new finding aids and better digitization.24 As such, this thesis is 
the only work on the AEFNR that utilizes the new Bentley collection and has researched the 
additional documents that have been donated since 2003.25 Secondary sources helped 
contextualize the intervention through Great War American policy to compare the AEFNR 
experience to that of their peers in France. 
                                                
21 Rhodes, 124. 
22 Willett, Kindle Location 71/7303. 
23 Willett cited 19 Bentley collections; this thesis utilizes 51 BHL collections. 
24 "About the Polar Bear Expedition Digital Collections," Polar Bear Expedition Digital Collections, accessed February 18, 2017, 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/polaread/about.html. 
25 The collection homepage states that “we continue to add newly discovered collections every year”, "About the Polar Bear 
Expedition Digital Collections," Polar Bear Expedition Digital Collections, accessed February 18, 2017, 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/polaread/about.html. 
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David Kennedy’s Over Here analyzed World War One through the context of American 
society.26 This book represents a landmark departure from other Great War books as Kennedy was 
among the first to consider the effects of the war on American society rather than through a 
geopolitical frame. Kennedy’s focus on the American soldier experience in France makes the book 
a cornerstone of this thesis’s secondary literature. This thesis verifies and modifies themes 
Kennedy identified when looking at the brief snapshot of World War One in North Russia from 
1918 to 1919. It also continues his research’s emphasis on diaries, as “thousands of men […] 
faithfully kept journals while they were in the Army” and “even a modest sampling of the personal 
documents left behind […] reveals common responses to the shared enterprise”.27  
 Most secondary sources focus on the pre-intervention political machinations and the 
strategy in North Russia. The chief source for the events leading up to the intervention and U.S. – 
USSR diplomatic consequences is statesman and historian George Kennan’s The Decision to 
Intervene (1958). Kennan analyzed the policy decisions which led to the conflict and concluded 
that “never, surely, in the history of American diplomacy has so much been paid for so little”.28 
Historian David Foglesong, in his 1995 America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism, broke from 
Kennan. Foglesong described the American intervention in Russia as a thought-out culmination of 
longstanding covert tactics used by the Wilson administration to combat Bolshevism.29 Both 
sources illustrated the poor execution of the intervention at the highest ranks of the confused 
American government, a theme which trickled down to the ordinary soldier. 
 The intervention did not occur in a vacuum, and Jonathan Smele’s The “Russian” Civil 
Wars (2015) and Orlando Figes’ A People’s Tragedy (1996) put the intervention in perspective 
                                                
26 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
27 Kennedy, 205. 
28 Kennan, 471. 
29 Michael J. Carley reviewed Foglesong and postulated that “Foglesong indirectly raises another question. Why do most Western 
historians start the Cold War after 1945, rather than after 1917? Foglesong's book includes the familiar characteristics and 
shibboleths of what I would call the "later Cold War".” In Michael J. Carley. “Review of Foglesong, David S., America's Secret 
War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920”. H-Russia, H-Net Reviews. June, 1996. 
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from the Russian side. Easily inferred from the title, Smele argued that the Russian Civil War was 
but one piece of the “compound compendium of overlapping wars and conflicts” which plagued 
Tsarist Russia and the new Bolshevik state from 1916 to 1926.30 Smele emphasized the 
complicated nature of the political situation in Russia and the increasing tenacity of the Red Army, 
realities that plagued the American soldiers. Figes reassessed the Russian Civil War “as a human 
event of complicated individual tragedies” by detailing the role of Russian peasants and arguing 
that ordinary Russian sided with the merciless Bolsheviks.31 Figes’ examinations of propaganda 
and ordinary Russians demonstrated the odds faced by the AEFNR, who served amongst 
increasingly hostile Russians and were surrounded by powerful propaganda. Ultimately, this thesis 
argues that this propaganda proved critical in the morale crisis the AEFNR faced. 
The thesis comprises three chronological chapters to detail the experience of soldiers in the 
AEFNR. All chapters are heavily sourced in primary documents and attempt to use the soldiers’ 
own words as much as possible. The first two chapters examine the period between September 
1918 to June 1919, from the soldiers’ first landing to their evacuation. Chapter One begins with 
brief background information to place the expedition in context. It then identifies key themes 
which were apparent in multiple primary sources: poor sanitation, health issues, unpreparedness in 
training and supplies, violence, and impressions of Russian civilians.32 These topics illustrate the 
harsh conditions faced by the AEFNR in the early months of the expedition. Chapter One ends on 
Armistice Day, November 1918, to emphasize the shift in morale which occurred thereafter.  
Chapter Two details the deteriorating morale after the Armistice and analyzes several 
contributing factors. The Armistice innately undermined the soldier’s sense of purpose as many 
                                                
30 Jonathan Smele, The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916 – 1926: Ten Years That Shook the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 7. 
31 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Viking, 1996), xvii, 573. 
32 It is worthy to note that many of these themes, such as supplying deficiencies, did not end in November 1918. Many of the 
themes continued until the AEFNR’s evacuation. Such themes are covered in Chapter One because that is when they first emerged 
in soldier literature. For example, while the Spanish Flu’s first outbreak began in September and is thus addressed in the first 
chapter, health conditions continued to be an issue until evacuation. 
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believed that their goal was to reopen the Eastern Front and fight German influence in Russia. As 
such, their continued presence in Russia was confusing. Several elements of the winter and spring 
campaign accentuated the post-Armistice morale crisis. Cold weather made fighting conditions 
even more arduous, and casualties rose as a result. The Americans functioned as a piece of a 
diverse Allied force. Tensions rose precipitously between the AEFNR and their Russian and 
British counterparts due to their unreliable Russian peers and mistreatment by the British. The 
Bolsheviks coalesced into a formidable fighting force due to new Red Army organizational 
strategies and fought the AEFNR in deadly battles after the Armistice. The confused military 
leadership in North Russia, who knew little more of the purpose than the ordinary soldier, relayed 
little information and did not act to stem declining morale. Morale waned unabated until it 
collapsed entirely in some companies, manifesting in mutinous activity. As the mission shifted 
from an offensive to a defensive campaign, the men had more time for leisure. They also had time 
to analyze their predicament, read propaganda, and read literature covering the domestic 
controversy over the intervention.  
The third chapter breaks from the chronological flow of prior chapters and examines the 
role of propaganda among the AEFNR. By reviewing British, American, and Bolshevik 
propaganda and American media, it is evident that such materials undermined morale. British 
propaganda aggravated Anglo-American tensions and inspired demoralizing Allied atrocities. 
American media spread news of the domestic controversy that surrounded the intervention and 
verified the soldiers’ post-Armistice confusion over the expedition’s purpose. Bolshevik 
propaganda called attention to preexisting poor conditions and proposed answers to questions that 
American military leadership did not address. Chapter Three differentiates the thesis from Rhodes 
and Willett who describe propaganda exposure but do not identify it as a key theme that impacted 
morale. 
16 
The conclusion follows the AEFNR’s evacuation and veteran experience while questioning 
the impact of fighting face to face with the Bolsheviks. It explores the veterans’ opinions of 
Bolshevism and their longstanding comradery after returning home, manifested through the Polar 
Bear Association. After a 1929 trip to recover remains from North Russia, veterans still expressed 
perplexity about the expedition’s goals. The conclusion uses Polar Bear Association documents to 
illustrate how, several years after leaving Russia, the veterans already associated the military 
mission with other misguided American interventions. Finally, the thesis synthesizes the findings 
of the prior chapters to draw conclusions from the AEFNR’s time in Russia to contribute new 
findings on an unexplored chapter of the twentieth century American soldier experience and to 
reassess the timeline of American interventionism. 
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Chapter One: Arduous Beginnings 
September – November 1918 
  
It’s the land of the Infernal Odor 
The land of the National Smell 
The average American soldier 
Would sooner be quartered in Hell1 
-Sgt. Roger Clark 
 
On September 4, 1918, Second Lieutenant Charles Brady Ryan peered off the deck of the HMT 
Somali towards the emerging coast. French and British warships swayed against the docks nearby. 
Lt. Ryan looked beyond the waterways where the White Sea meets the Dvina River to observe 
storehouses, saw mills, lumber yards, white and grey houses, and church spires rising in the 
distance (Photograph 1.i). Lt. Ryan, like many of his fellow soldiers, had never left North America 
before. Now, after a brief stay in England, the nearly six thousand Americans comprising the 339th 
Infantry Regiment, 310th Engineers, 337th Field Hospital, and 337th Ambulance Company found 
themselves over four thousand miles away from home in a foreign and mysterious place. 
 The soldiers did not know what to expect as the wooded coast came into view. Some 
aboard the Somali felt excited to reach their destination. Lt. Ryan, coming off a “very nice trip” 
with plentiful food and no run-ins with German submarines, remarked how the land seemed to be 
of good quality.2 Two hours later, Lt. Ryan had reassessed his thoughts on North Russia, 
amending his comment on the good land in favor of the phrase “most god forsaken hole on 
Earth”.3 As the men unloaded in Archangel, they quickly noted the putrid smell and the poor state 
of the city and residents. One can imagine the looks on the faces of the men, absorbing this new 
and strange place, as they wondered how the AEFNR got here in the first place. 
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The Path of the AEFNR 
 By 1917 the Great War had escalated into the deadliest conflict in history. The combatant 
nations saw the war effort to be in dire straits.4 As conflict ravaged Europe, the collapse of 
Tsarism in late 1917 and the subsequent Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia exacerbated worries 
amongst the Allies. These worries were confirmed with the closing of the Eastern front, and the 
leaders of Britain and France pressed for action.  
British, French, and American leaders lamented the rise of the radical Bolsheviks to 
oppose the democratic Provisional Government. These countries, especially Britain, became 
alarmed at the news that the Bolsheviks had taken Archangel in February 1918 and were 
confiscating the city’s vast military stores, shipped to the Tsarist regime on loan. In March 1918 
the Bolsheviks made peace with Germany by signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, effectively closing 
the Eastern Front. This became the last straw for the increasingly desperate Allies, and the British 
and French governments formulated a campaign with three initial goals: to rescue the stranded 
Czecho-Slovak Legion,5 protect Allied military stores and investment in Archangel and 
Murmansk,6 and reopen the Eastern Front. A fourth goal, proposed by historian David Foglesong, 
was the hopeful eradication of Bolshevism as part of Britain, France, and the United States’ 
formulaic struggle against radical left movements.7 In addition, the objectives seemed of the 
utmost importance and timeliness because of rumors that the Germans and Bolsheviks were 
cooperating. Due to the overexerted resources used in the Western theatre, they turned to the 
United States to provide manpower for the campaign.  
In only a matter of months, events a world away had left Washington and London 
confused and created conditions for misguided action. Pro-interventionists gained momentum in 
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the State Department, and soon enough the highest officials in President Woodrow Wilson’s 
administration joined the chorus. His advisor Colonel Edward M. House, the Lansing-headed State 
Department, the American representatives on the ground in Russia, and the British and French 
governments all wheedled Wilson to formally intervene, to which he finally agreed.8 Wilson 
formalized their thinking in a confused written statement, called his Aide Memoire, on July 17, 
1918.9 The paper contradicts itself repeatedly, both calling for a military intervention while 
reiterating the sovereign rights of the Russian state by stating “that military intervention there 
would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it […] and that it would be of no 
advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany.”10 The piece 
generally outlines a role for American soldiers: to protect the military stores but not to launch 
offensives in North Russia and Siberia.11  
Wilson’s rambling and chaotic policy gave the British leeway for usage of American 
troops under their command. Historian Benjamin Rhodes claimed that the British selectively read 
the policy to understand Wilson authorizing a military intervention.12 Rhodes called attention to 
the fact that the British military acknowledged the ambiguity of Wilson’s policy, failing to even 
send a copy of the policy to British General F. C. Poole, who was to lead the expedition.13  
The first American military involvement in North Russia came in August 1918 as a small 
fifty-man detachment of American sailors joined the British and French. In early August, a 
British-orchestrated coup d’état ousted the pro-Bolshevik government in Archangel and replaced it 
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with a White Russian leader, N.V. Chaikovsky.14 The coup, followed by a demonstration of 
British airpower over Archangel, precipitated the Bolshevik retreat south as they interpreted the 
British seaplanes as a part of a large-scale invasion. Poole’s British, French, and fifty American 
sailors, totaling around 1,500 men, landed in Archangel on August 2 to large celebrations in the 
roughly 100,000-person city. Even before the bulk of an Allied force reached Archangel, Poole 
had demonstrated the aggressiveness with which he would lead the campaign. After one day the 
Americans followed the British south down the Archangel-Vologda railroad, with the goal of 
eventually reaching Vologda, and faced their first combat with Red forces. Less than one month 
after Wilson formulated a policy, Poole disregarded the American agreement to defend supplies in 
favor of an offensive. The Bolsheviks destroyed bridges behind them to slow the Allied advance 
and Poole was forced to wait for reinforcements.15  
Those reinforcements comprised 6,293 British and Canadians, 5,302 Americans, 1,686 
French, and 2,715 White Russian and other nationality troops in Archangel as of December 1918. 
Another Allied force of 15,000 troops supported them from Murmansk.16 Nearly 9 out of 10 
Americans hailed from Michigan, with 70% from Detroit.17 Many of the men or their parents were 
immigrants with roots in Eastern Europe, giving the Americans Russian-communication abilities 
unmatched by the other fighting forces.18 While the AEFNR was a sizeable body, it was not 
enough to combat the well-equipped19 and numerous20 Bolshevik forces.  
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The AEFNR’s story begins in Michigan. After the June 1918 draft the recruits left their 
homes and travelled to Camp Custer and the men broke into regiments. The 339th, due to its high 
proportion of Detroiters, became known as “Detroit’s Own”.21 The urgency in Europe called for 
new soldiers and prompted abridged training at Camp Custer including riflery, gas attack 
preparation, and other courses designed for the war in France. After three short weeks at Camp 
Custer the regiments travelled by rail through Detroit and Buffalo to Long Island, NY, where they 
spent several days between Camp Mills and visits to New York City. The soldiers subsequently 
arrived in New York harbor, convinced they were going to France. On July 22, the men left aboard 
the troop transports SS Plattsburg and HMT Northumberland. After organizing a naval convoy, 
the troops began their weary trip across the Atlantic, still swarming with German U-boats.22  
Despite sparse soldier records of submarine encounters and plentiful records of the 
unpleasant conditions aboard the transports, the convoy arrived unharmed in Liverpool, England 
in early August. The men still believed that they were destined for France. The 339th continued 
training at Camp Stoney Castle while enjoying occasional trips to London. It was at Stoney Castle, 
during more fire-drill training sessions, that the men first learned of their true objective.23 
Commander in Chief of the AEF, General John J. Pershing, selected the 339th for two reasons: the 
cold-weather experience of their commander Lt. Colonel George Evans Stewart and the fact that 
most of the men hailed from a cold region of America.24 To the chagrin of the men, they were 
alerted that the British would command the AEFNR and were issued British winter provisions and 
clothing. On August 25 the men mobilized to London, where they took trains north to Newcastle-
on-Tyne. From the docks in England the troops boarded the British transports Nagoya, Somali, 
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and Tydeus and set out along the Norwegian coast, into the White Sea, and onwards to Archangel. 
The Americans arrived in Archangel on September 4, 1918 (Photograph 1.ii). 
After arriving in North Russia, the AEFNR splintered into several forces and their 
experiences began to diverge (See Maps and Photograph 1.iii). As the men split and moved toward 
the fronts they were often separated by miles of swampy, forested, inaccessible terrain. Colonel 
Stewart watched with a sense of helplessness from Archangel as his small force spread throughout 
North Russia, an area larger than Texas, under the orders of Poole.25 Poole’s Allied forces 
executed aggressive drives towards Moscow, although they never reached south of Ust-Padenga. 
Some forces stayed in Archangel while most went south along six fronts: the Pinega Front, the 
Onega Front, the Railway Front, Seletskoe Front, the Dvina River Front, and the Vaga River 
Front. After only one day in Archangel, the 3rd Battalion of the 339th packed into boxcars on the 
rickety wood-burning locomotives and headed south while the 2nd Battalion disembarked to patrol 
Archangel, leaving the 1st Battalion the thankless action of loading into disgusting vermin-infested 
barges and floating down the Dvina.26 The sanitary conditions endured by the AEFNR during their 
first week reflected a consistent theme of the pre-Armistice phase of the expedition. 
Health, Disease, and Sanitation 
 Even before the Polar Bears landed in Archangel on September 4, sanitary conditions were 
miserable. From the outbreaks of Spanish Influenza aboard the troop transports to the infested 
homes they stayed in while at the front, the men noted poor living conditions unanimously. The 
often disgusting and dangerous environments the Polar Bears faced were not entirely unique to 
this expedition; the lack of medical technology, wartime sanitation standards, and outbreaks of 
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Spanish Flu also became an integral part of the soldier experience in France.27 Health issues 
denoted the early days with foreboding overtones as fatalities due to disease increased. 
The deadly Spanish Influenza brewed among the unwitting AEFNR before they even 
reached the White Sea. After a four-day incubation period, outbreaks began in early September 
aboard the Somali and Nagoya. Pvt. Godfrey J. Anderson of the 337th Field Hospital recounted his 
experience aboard the Somali: “All bunks were occupied by soldiers desperately ill, with raging 
fevers […] The first death occurred on the White Sea and the body was dumped to a watery 
grave”.28 The situation aboard the Nagoya was similar, where Pvt. Edwin Arkins recorded the 
events unfolding: “Spanish Influenza breaks out; men begging for medical attention. Insufficient 
medical personnel”.29 The conditions on the troops transports were very conducive for a 
contagious disease. 
The scope of the deadly outbreak can be attributed to a lack of preventive measures aboard 
the vessels. The British ship lodgings placed soldiers near each other with no room for a 
quarantine, an ideal setting for the disease.30 Sergeant Edward Trombley agreed, writing that all 
“three deaths [of his fellow soldiers] were caused indirectly by the bad sanitary conditions on 
board H. M. Transport Nagoya”.31 The persistent Spanish Influenza spread through the 339th even 
after departing the clustered conditions on the ships. 
Initially, Archangel’s medical facilities were completely under resourced and unsanitary.32 
Regarding the hospital in September, Capt. Joel R. Moore, Lt. Harry H. Mead, and Lt. Lewis E. 
Jahns asked: “What “flu”-weakened soldier will ever forget those double decked pine board beds, 
sans mattress, sans linen, sans pillows? […] The glory of dying in France to lie under a field of 
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poppies had come to this drear mystery of dying in Russia under a dread disease in a strange and 
unlovely place”.33 Pvt. Anderson, as part of the medical team, recounted his time in the makeshift 
hospital in Archangel, “a bedlam of coughings, hackings, of rasping stertorous breathings, of 
moans and incoherent cries, all like some grisly charnel house”.34 He recorded numerous deaths as 
his colleagues and he constantly removed the newly deceased from the ward during the night 
shifts, pegging total Spanish Flu fatalities at roughly one hundred and dictating the creation of an 
American cemetery in Archangel. This estimate is high, and later sources count 69 fatalities due to 
the disease.35 Still, Anderson was correct in his assessment of the lack of available resources. In a 
later report filed on the work of the medical detachment, Chief Surgeon Jonas Longley noted that, 
despite being informed in England of available medical facilities, the “Archangel district was 
practically without hospital facilities” for the 175 cases of Influenza (Photograph 1.iv).36 The 
unhealthy circumstances in Archangel and beyond prompted disgust amongst the men. 
Soldiers’ early impressions of Archangel, even after the containment of the Spanish 
Influenza after several weeks, reflect the lack of sanitary conditions in Russia which were 
commonplace in the U.S. at the time, such as modern plumbing. Upon arrival, soldiers recorded 
thoughts regarding Archangel. Lt. Ryan noted the disgusting “assorted odors”.37 Corporal Fred 
Kooyers of “E” Company recorded the free livestock roaming the streets and the “cockroaches by 
the millions,” ultimately leaving Kooyers to label Archangel as “the dirtiest city we had ever been 
in”.38 Normal infrastructure had fallen into disarray as the government of Archangel shifted 
between the White and Red Russians in the prior months, creating cesspools of feces which 
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contaminated drinking water.39 To the surprise of the men, Archangel would be one of the most 
sanitary places they would encounter in Russia. After early hardships with makeshift facilities, 
Archangel became the center for operations and the Americans turned an imperial-era educational 
facility into a decent hospital.40 Accounts from the front illustrated the relative luxury of the city. 
Sanitary conditions on the front were lacking if not entirely absent and doctors often could 
do little to stop deaths from disease. Soldiers rode in barges previously used to transport goods 
ranging from coal to livestock during early operations along the river front. Clarence Scheu wrote 
down his experience on the barges: “what a rotten hole they have dumped us into now, coal dust 2 
inches thick, damp, filthy dungeon, we are sleeping on bottom […] no light, ventilation, or 
anything”.41 Many of these soldiers still had early flu symptoms from their prior boat ride. Pvt. 
Arkins recorded the terror aboard his barge as multiple men died from disease compounded by a 
lack of care and poor conditions: “Man from Co. C dies on barge. Left in improvised coffin on 
open front of barge. Blood from underneath coffin trickles across floor of barge while we eat our 
hard tack and black tea”.42 Lt. Henry Katz, a medic from New York City, also travelled on the 
barges. He wrote of the poor accommodations upon landing in Beresnick, where several sick men 
had to be stored in a wood shed and three died subsequently.43 Water sanitation posed another 
issue on the front. Sgt. John Crissman, who managed to avoid the Spanish Flu, commented on the 
issue: “Sick today for the first time since entering Army. Stomach must be poisoned from impure 
water. Water very poor. Wells very low so all waste material runs back into well”.44 Civilian 
Russian homes were an improvement, albeit a small one. 
When the soldiers lodged in towns and had accommodations with roofs, the Russian 
houses were often filthy and insect-ridden. Such was Corpl. Cleo Colburn’s experience, who 
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renamed one of his early posts the “Cockroach Inn”.45 As the weather cooled, the Russian families 
often brought their livestock inside with the soldiers, adding to the amalgamation of dirt and 
vermin.46 Not all Polar Bears described Russian houses as dirty, however. Pvt. Roy Paul 
Rasmussen voiced a rare alternate opinion in a letter home: “Because I say they are log houses 
don’t think that they are not clean, for most of them are”. 47 While most men disagreed with 
Rasmussen, Russian homes had their perks over life outside on the front. 
Despite unsanitary conditions, many Russian homes featured bath houses that functioned 
as steam rooms for bathing. Sgt. Silver Parrish described the bath houses: “They are made out of 
logs […] and they are about 8 ft long […] set [with] a rock furnace. They build a fire and when the 
water is hot they get in there and [throw] water on the hot rocks and it makes hot steam”.48 These 
rare opportunities to bathe in a relaxing setting were revered by soldiers.49 Chances to bathe came 
infrequently for soldiers on the front; Corpl. Frank Douma, in mid-October, had his “first bath in 
Russia and also washed [his] clothes. Richmond discovered some cooties”.50 Lt. Ryan dryly noted 
his appreciation for these “monthly bath[s]”, which usually improved his bad moods: “Took a 
Russian bath and now feel 100% better”.51 
Due to these circumstances, soldiers were constantly sick.52 The lack of available medics 
or useful supplies, especially in the early months of the campaign, contributed to the spread of 
disease and generally unhealthy conditions.53 The poor sanitary environment that came to 
characterize North Russia for the Americans was further compounded by a lack of preparation and 
supplying, especially with medical supplies. 
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Supplying Deficiencies and Training Shortfalls 
Early worries regarding medical supplies foreshadowed the poor planning which came to 
plague the expedition. Military command lacked foresight for proper supplies in the early months 
of the mission, and the AEFNR realized notable medical, dietary, clothing, and weaponry 
shortages after several weeks. Soldiers bemoaned the lacking few luxuries they reasonably 
desired, such as cigarettes and desert foods. The deficiency of basic items was a normal part of the 
Great War and the AEF in Europe also experienced food shortages.54 However, the obscure 
geographic location of North Russia, compounded by the threat of German U-boats and the 
freezing of the White Sea, made resupplying rarer than in France. Willett proposed that the lack of 
enthusiasm for the campaign by the American military was a factor in the AEFNR’s poor 
outfitting, citing Army Chief of Staff General Peyton March who wanted little to do with the 
expedition and refused to divert supplies and weapons from the Western Front.55 This claim aligns 
with General Pershing’s sentiment, as he too condemned the Allied efforts on other fronts like 
Palestine and Gallipoli, believing “that our task clearly lay on the Western Front and that we 
would have all we could do to beat the enemy there”.56 Without much help from the American 
military, supply issues became paramount early in the campaign and continued until evacuation. 
Crucial supplies were lacking from the outset in clothing and medical capacities. As the 
transportation ships en route from England to Russia reached colder temperatures, the men noticed 
that their overcoats had been stowed in inaccessible cargo holds.57 The outbreak of Spanish Flu 
demonstrated medical supply issues: “Eight days out at sea, all medical supplies were exhausted, 
and conditions became so congested in the ships’ quarters that the sick, running high fever, were 
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compelled to lie in the hold or on deck exposed to the chill winds”.58 Even after landing, the lack 
of provisions drove an early wedge between the Americans and British commanders. In one 
instance some claimed that medicine had been left in favor of British whiskey rations.59  
Many soldiers complained about living conditions, compounded by rain and offensive 
maneuvers, on the front. The contrast between Archangel and the front was stark: Sgt. Robert 
Granville remarked how his “office job [with the Medical corps of the 337th Field Hospital in 
Archangel] isn’t the easiest job in the world, but as far as physical comfort goes I’m one hundred 
percent better off than the men at the front”.60 After landing at Archangel, the British ordered 
hundreds of American soldiers to depart for the front without a single blanket.61 The men spent 
countless nights sleeping without shelter or proper clothing for the cold that reached sub-zero 
temperatures. After several skirmishes in mid-September, Lt. Ryan guarded the front line for three 
nights without sleep, blankets, or fires (for stealth purposes). The climate, while not as cold in the 
fall as in the winter, challenged the men in different ways as it rained constantly. Due to the lack 
of bathing many soldiers, like Corpl. James Sibley, became encased in mud: “I fell down in that 
place and when I got up I was just a mass of mud rifle and everything was mud”.62 Oftentimes the 
troops spent nights in wet areas, compounding the cold. Lt. Ryan described his “worst night ever” 
which he spent “soaking wet” and Engineer Jay Bonnell further elaborated: “in a swamp all night 
[…] so we did not do any sleeping but walked back and forth all night to keep from freezing”.63 In 
an interview conducted in the 1970s, veteran Levi Bartels of “K” Company claimed that he did not 
sleep inside until Christmas.64 Ryan commented on the conditions’ impact on the morale of his 
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enlisted men: “The condition of the men is terrible. They have been out here for a week with water 
up to the knees”.65  
Soldiers often braved the elements in their poor lodgings without proper clothing for the 
environment nor supplies, like cigarettes, to boost their spirits. In the perpetually wet autumn 
fighting soldiers went without changes of clothing such as fresh socks.66 In his diary, Pvt. John 
Piers remarked that he had his “first change of clothes since I left the Boat Nagoya” in 
November.67 Veteran Harry Costello recalled how during “October many of our men were 
patrolling and fighting in shoes so worn out that their feet were practically on the ground” and that 
men on the front “had no change of underwear, their clothing was torn”.68 Morale eroded further 
as the soldiers patrolled on many nights without cigarette rations.69 Men like Ewald Billeau and 
Clarence Scheu, in dire need of smoking materials, resorted to smoking “tea leaves and dried 
moss”.70 So pronounced was the effect of missing “smokes, which they craved above all”71 on 
morale that, after a three-week shortage, a delivery of cigarettes caused Sgt. Trombley to remark: 
“I have never seen such a change in a body of men”.72 
The lack of available quality food made the cold, wet nights hard to endure.73 Willett noted 
the pervasiveness of food in the soldier experience: “Virtually every letter or diary of soldiers on 
the expedition made reference to the poor quality of food at the front”.74 In September and 
October, soldiers fought for days with only the small amounts of food they had brought on their 
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persons.75 The meals provided by the British consisted of unfamiliar concoctions lacking 
nutritional value, such as the detested hardtack. Hardtack, a familiar ration for British soldiers of 
the era, is a dry biscuit that is usually tasteless and of hard texture. The disgusting and rigid nature 
of hardtack became a comical recollection for some Americans and rallied the men around a 
common distaste for British rations. In a letter home, Ernest Oliver Andrews commented on 
hardtack’s texture: “believe me it is some hard tack”.76 Roger Sherman Clark humorously assessed 
hardtack in a poem:  
How verdant they bloom in the field of my mem’ry- 
The feeds we enjoy in old Company “C”, 
The mystery stew, the delicious “blumb-apple”, 
And even the tan-liquor rationed as tea. 
I chuckle to think of the M & V [meat and vegetables] Mixture –  
That vegetable compound of flavor so rare; 
And last but not least, of the famous Iron Ration, 
The U.S.A. Hardtack, they fed to us there. 
 The armor-plate Hardtack, the jaw-breaking Hardtack, 
 The case-hardened Hardtack they fed to us there.77 
 
Not only was the food scare and of poor quality, it was also unfamiliar amongst the Americans. 
Instead of standard American rations, the British replaced staple American foods with British 
ones. Supply issues were only one part of the larger motif of ill preparation. 
The weaponry and training proved an equally disastrous aspect of the soldiers’ experience. 
While in England, the men were stripped of their American guns and some were armed with the 
British-made Vickers gun. The Vickers gun utilized water-cooling technology and the sub-zero 
temperatures rendered it useless in crucial situations.78 The men were also equipped with the 
inferior and detested Moison-Nagant rifles in favor of the Enfield rifles they had trained with.79 
Many of these rifles had the tendency to misfire, resulting in American soldiers accidently 
shooting themselves. Lt. Costello remembered the Russian rifles: “we lacked everything but the 
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Russian type of rifle fitted with a bayonet that would not stay on. Any American soldier who has 
even held one of these Russian rifles in his hands will swear they can “shoot around corners””.80 
Due to the lack of American arms, the doughboys became acquainted with a variety of 
guns from around the world: the British Lewis and Vickers machine guns, the one-pounder, the 
French Chauchat automatic rifle, French rifle grenade weapons, Stokes mortars, the French 75 
gun, and various artillery variations.81 This aspect of the AEFNR experience aligns with that of a 
doughboy fighting in Europe, as Kennedy explained “the AEF in fact purchased more of its 
supplies in Europe than it shipped from the United States”.82 Still, the quality of American 
armament displeased the soldiers. Lt. Ryan utilized his prior military knowledge to point out the 
deficiency in equipment, claiming that the American troops were not nearly as well prepared as 
they were in the Spanish American War.83 
Several recollections illustrate the difficulty posed by weaponry. As temperatures dropped 
in the winter, Lt. Katz and a mixed group of Russians and Americans patrolled near the 
Bolshevik-occupied Kodema. During the advance, they noticed that their one pound cannon and 
machine guns had frozen.84 While Katz escaped the situation unscathed, the malfunctioning guns 
added to the unpredictable rigors of the campaign. The story of Sgt. Crissman’s first combat 
experience reflected the variable usefulness of the weapons supplied to the AEFNR. On 
September 21 near Shenkursk, Crissman and his men engaged the enemy: “At 10:30 AM our boat 
fired upon my Machine Guns and snipers […] we sailed under fire with our MG and Artillery 
continually throwing shells into town. This is the first time we have been under fire”.85 Crissman 
remarked that, while the “MG [was] very effective,” some weapons did not work as well: “In first 
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fray going over hill I got jam in loading so haven’t fired a shot yet”.86 Such stories reveal the 
problems that plagued many of the guns used by the Polar Bears. While Crissman and Katz were 
lucky to escape with jammed weapons, many soldiers were not. 
Many Allied troops were ill-equipped to use the weapons. The British military shipped 
armored automobiles to provide support, yet the vehicles quickly got stuck in mud and became a 
nonfactor.87 While British airpower, naval guns, and the lack of experience of the Reds 
compensated for these disadvantages and allowed the Allies to swiftly take territory in the early 
stages of the conflict, the cold winter rendered these offensive benefits useless. The Americans 
soon found themselves outmanned and outgunned as the campaign turned from offensive to 
defensive with the switch of British command in October 1918. The Americans struggled as a 
fighting force early on as well. Just like the AEF in Europe, the AEFNR were new to combat, and 
they reflected this learning curve in the first weeks.88 The British allotted subpar commanders and 
soldiers for the “sideshow” expedition in Russia, resulting in unrealistic military planning and 
below average soldiers to carry out such plans.89 Rhodes argued that, as “both sides were forced to 
rely on untrained, poorly motivated second class troops who were outfitted with improvised 
equipment […] the military operations in North Russia were often amateurish” when compared 
“with the professional conduct of the war on the western front”.90 Consequently, the Allied forces 
fighting alongside the Americans often did not meet their objectives.91 
Violence 
Many soldiers reflected on their first exposures to combat in North Russia. David Kennedy 
noted that “a romantic view of war had a peculiar hold on the American mind, which still throbbed 
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with memories of the Civil War”.92 The same “affirmative and inspiring” attitude toward combat 
that appeared in the literary works of American soldiers in France, namely Alan Seeger, Robert 
Service, and Arthur Empey, also pervaded AEFNR writing.93 However, some AEFNR 
recollections diverge from Seeger’s glorified assessment of the “magnificent orchestra of war”,94 
perhaps due to differences in the settings and durations of fighting between Russia and France. By 
delving into several soldiers’ initial reactions to combat, the similarities and differences between 
the war in France and North Russia become apparent. 
Several Polar Bears, like Seeger, Service, and Empey, accepted Theodore Roosevelt’s 
vision of WWI as their own “Great Adventure”.95 First Lieutenant George W. Stoner wrote about 
his first combat experience in his diary: “Wed., Sept. 11 – “Baptism of Fire” 1st battle – very 
successful, interesting, and exciting, no one injured”.96 Sgt. Parris emphasized the Americans’ 
tenacity in an early skirmish to retake Seltso: “we charged yelling like a pack of wolves, and the 
enemy fell before our onslaught and many went down, never to get up”.97 Pvt. Rasmussen also 
stressed the casualties the Americans inflicted upon the Bolsheviks: “didn’t see or hear anything 
until they fired on us at 5 A.M. […] we rushed across the swamp, getting all wet. In a few minutes 
we were on a hill where we lay on the frozen ground fighting Bolsheviks […] At the battle we 
kept low all the time listening to the bullets flying overhead. We lost six men and four wounded. 
We killed thirty and wounded fifty of their men”.98 Not all soldiers glorified war in their writing, 
however. 
Some AEFNR writing illustrated alternative impressions of war. For Ernest Andrews the 
first battle was almost mechanical: “I have been in one 30 hr engagement with the Bolsheviks and 
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drew first blood. I often wondered how I would feel to [fire at] a human being […] but when I got 
to it I had no time to think about it and after the first shot it was easy enough”.99 Lt. Ryan wrote in 
a similar tone: “This is my first experience under fire and it will certainly leave and [sic] 
impression that will all be remembered […] They are [shelling] all around me, high explosives and 
shrapnel”.100 Soldier Lawrence K. Montgomery portrayed the duality of his early combat 
experience, remembering it humorously for his drunkenness but also describing the fear: “I was 
loaded. Because we was going over the top at six o’clock across the river to take ‘em. I never was 
so drunk in my life. I never was. Don’t let a guy tell you that when you’re going over the top, that 
you’re not scared because he’s a liar if he tells you that”.101 Corpl. Frank Douma presented a far 
bleaker assessment of combat in North Russia:  
Leek and I had to go to the fartherest [sic] forward point and crawl to the wire fence. The B 
Company men refused to go. We lay there in the mud all night. Bullets were constantly 
flying over head [sic]. It turned cold toward morning and we suffered something terrible. 
At 6:00 A.M. we were sent in. On the way in a machine gun opened up on us and the 
bullets tore up the ground all around us but neither one of us were hit. It was the worst 
night I ever hope to spend. War surely is hell.102 
 
After a battle in late September, Pvt. Arkins wrote about the first casualty he saw in a gruesome 
depiction: “The sight of that first casualty I’ll never forget; the lower part of face a bloody [sic] 
mess; the eye lids swollen and blue and the head resting on the inside of the upturned helmet”.103 
These dark and realistic portrayals of violence continued as the initial shock and awe wore off. 
While the scale of the campaign in North Russia paled in comparison to France, the fighting was 
similarly grueling. 
The violence in Russia and France had similarities. Armored trains exchanged fire from 
both sides, adding to the chorus of artillery (Photograph 1.v). Several soldiers accused the Bolos 
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of using chemical warfare in the form of gas shells, although none bore witness to such an 
attack.104 Pvt. Arkins’ description of his first major battle also revealed similar tactics to fighting 
in France, as the men fixed bayonets.105 Widespread artillery strikes and the subsequent bouts of 
shell shock characterized both theatres of the conflict. Soldiers in both the AEF and AEFNR 
expressed duress under shellfire, a helpless state created by new weapons of war.106 Corporal 
Douma’s first exposure to violence near Toulgas was similar to the trench warfare in France: “We 
came upon the Bolos […] and they opened up on us with machine guns and pompoms. We had to 
dig in right where we were. That night we moved back to a fence in back of which we dug a 
system of trenches. We slept in the trenches all that night”.107 Trenches were a commonplace 
feature of the Russian expedition but were not as extensive as those in the West.108 AEFNR 
soldiers constructed blockhouses in addition to trenches. These square wooden structures served as 
lodging and defensive outposts to provide warmer accommodations. Fundamental differences, 
besides scale, existed in the violence experienced by the AEF and AENFR. 
The chief difference between France and Russia lay in the pace and frequency of combat. 
Soldiers in North Russia shifted between sleepless days under heavy fire and weeklong stretches 
with minimal occurrences.109 European soldiers remember the war as years of grinding trench 
warfare, a marathon of attrition.110 For the AEF, of which “few saw sustain or repeated battle” in 
their several-month campaign, the war was a 10K.111 The campaign in North Russia was a series 
of sprints.112 Cudahy remembered the early state of affairs: “There were no reinforcements at 
Archangel ready to relieve the jaded soldiers so far away, […] no diversion, no break in the 
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gloomy, monotonous, despairing hours; no relaxation from the ceaseless vigilance in the guard 
against surprise attack”.113 Such conditions led to extended engagements. For example, Clarence 
Scheu described an October retreat from Toulgas: “B. co. has had about 6 hours of sleep out of the 
past 84, a few of the fellows dropped in their tracks, on the march”.114 While the pace changed in 
the latter months of the intervention, the pre-Armistice period was extremely intense for many of 
the AEFNR, unlike anything experienced by most in the AEF due to its prolonged nature.  
Americans and the Russian People 
 Every AEFNR man interacted with Russian people in some form. Many fought alongside 
Russian soldiers, went on dates with Russian girls, lived with Russian peasant families, and 
discussed the political situation with Russian elites. Americans in North Russia saw a great variety 
of Russian people – different ethnic groups and people of different socioeconomic class – and 
their impressions were as varied as the Russian people themselves. 
 Most Polar Bears met Russians for the first time as they landed in September 1918 and 
they had mixed opinions. First Lieutenant Clarence J. Primm remembered how, before the 
Americans disembarked at Archangel, local Russians rowed small boats out to the troop transports 
to plead for cigarettes and food as the Bolsheviks had stripped the city clean before retreating.115 
Upon landing, the poverty in Archangel was made apparent: Sgt. Parrish, Lt. Ryan, and Corpl. 
Kooyers noted the “down trodden”116 and “filthy”117 “Russian civilians […] eating out of our 
garbage cans” (Photograph 1.vi).118 Clarence Scheu was initially skeptical of the Russian civilians: 
“natives seem hostile, but not openly, they seem to take us as a necessary evil, yet are terrified of 
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the Bolos”.119 Many Americans, like Sgt. Crissman, were unable to speak with the Russians at all: 
“Have some trouble getting along with Russians. Learning the Russian language”.120 Despite early 
communicating and trust issues, many developed friendships with Russian civilians. 
Many high-class Russians sought refuge in Archangel during the Civil War, despite the 
abysmal conditions in the city. Corpl. Hugo Salchow remembered his impression that “Archangel 
itself was the home of the Russian aristocrisy [sic] where [those] who had fled from Petrograd 
[…] found refuge”.121 In a letter home, Pvt. Rasmussen further detailed the Russian aristocracy: 
“The richer class dress and act enough like the people of the U.S. that you could not tell them from 
the Yanks if it were not for their language”.122 Ernest Andrews too found that “the Russians who 
have any education are very well educated but they are only a small part of the population and 
those who are not well educated can neither read nor write”.123 The majority of Russian-American 
friendships were with these “elite” Russian men, who were more likely to speak English.124 
 Many Americans befriended Russians and came to admire parts of a generalized Russian 
character. Brigadier General Wildst Preston Richardson, upon arriving in Archangel in April 1919, 
wrote that “relations between our troops, both officers and men, and the Russian people generally 
were cordial and sympathetic, with scarcely an instance of friction”.125 Ernest Andrews 
commented on the language benefits of his friendships with Russians: “we are also becoming 
aquanited [sic] with some Russian young men who are in the Russian army […] and a few boys 
who are attending school and studying English and we often spend an evening to our mutual 
advantage and I find myself able to [speak] Ruski better every day”.126 Andrews even struck up a 
                                                
119 BHL: Scheu, 7 (9/25/18). 
120 BHL: Crissman, “Diary”, 3 (9/18/18). 
121 BHL: Salchow, 4. 
122 BHL: Rasmussen, “Correspondence- Seeing the Land of the Midnight Sun”, (9/11/18). 
123 BHL: Andrews, “Letter to Parents”, 4-5 (12/25/18). 
124 BHL: Arkins, “Diary”, 23.  
125 Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Brig. Gen. Wilds P Richardson’s “Notes on the War and on the North Russian 
Expedition”, n.d.”, 51. 
126 BHL: Andrews, “Letter to Parents”, 4 (12/25/18). 
38 
friendship with a young male “expert Electrical engineer and a university graduate of Petrograd” 
as “we are of course interested in many of the same things”.127 Even those who did not write of 
friendships with Russian civilians appreciated Russian hospitality. Corporal C.E. Riordan 
applauded such characteristics: “The Russians are quite hospitable and usually trot out the 
steaming samovar128 a Russian institution which is universally popular with the Yanks”.129 
Similar to France and despite the anti-sexual vice campaigns by military institutions, many 
American men in North Russia sought out relations with native Russian women and possibly 
prostitutes.130 Some men spent holidays with Russian women.131 Others “met nice Drasky 
(Drozhka) girl[s]” and took them to dances in Archangel.132 Some, like Corporal Douma, had 
other experiences: “Last night a young Russian woman crawled into my bunk with me and wanted 
to spend the night. I kicked her out without much ado”.133 No matter the level of interaction, many 
of the AEFNR agreed on two things: the beauty of Russian women and their intent on dating 
them. Douma summarized the situation in Archangel: “There are some very pretty girls in this 
town. The first we have seen in Russia and we had dates almost every evening”.134 Despite 
preventative efforts by the army, venereal diseases plagued the AEFNR to a large degree, 
prompting lectures by military command.135 Americans did not always describe interactions with 
Russian civilians in such light terms, however. 
Many Americans observed the life of Russian peasants on the front lines. After his first trip 
to the River Front, Ernest Andrews wrote back to his parents: “When we left the barges and 
marched through the villages […] I began to realize what poverty meant”.136 Pvt. Rasmussen, like 
                                                
127 Ibid., 5. 
128 A Russian tea urn. 
129 BHL: C.E. Riordan, “Letter to James and “Buzzards””, C.E. Riordan Papers, 2 (3/20/19). 
130 Kennedy, 185-187. 
131 BHL: Walter McKenzie, “Diary”, Walter I. McKenzie Papers, 38 (1/7/19). 
132 BHL: Cleo Colburn, “Diary”, 3. 
133 BHL: Douma, “Diary”, 13 (1/20/19). 
134 BHL: Douma, “Diary”, 18 (4/8-13/19); Henry Abel, “Newspaper clipping”, Henry Abel Papers; Kooyers, “Diary”, 10 (1/30/19). 
135 BHL: Kooyers, “Diary”, 10; Willett, Kindle Location 2863/7303. 
136 BHL: Andrews, “Letter to Parents”, 3 (10/19/18). 
39 
Andrews, had never seen a peasantry class like that of Russia before: “The peasant class of people 
here are much different than those of the U.S. I feel sorry for some of them”.137 Some attributed 
the poverty to the desolate land, remarking that the peasants “seem to be able to eke out a bare 
existence from the soil” (Photograph 1.vii and 1.viii).138 The plight of the poorest Russians also 
worried engineers, who saw the nature of labor in Russia: “loading is done by boys and girls. 
Some not more than twelve years of age. I can hardly bear to look at these mere children doing 
men’s work. Their lot in this life certainly must be hard to bear. Scenes like this make a person 
realize what war moans. It seems like the innocent suffer most”.139 The conditions faced by poor 
Russian peasants led some in the AEFNR to empathize with their situation. 
The experiences made many reconsider their preconceived notions of Russians: “The 
people, for the most part seem very friendly and […] They are very polite amongst themselves 
[…] From the observations I have made here, I believe, we in American have a wrong conception 
of the Russian, who we consider boorish in manner […] I have formed the opposite opinion”.140 
Other Polar Bears confirmed their “respect for the Russian citizen”, lauding the craftsmanship and 
character of the “honest, decent, straight-forward, fine [Russian] people”.141 Salchow recalled a 
tale that demonstrated the point:  
There was a story – I know it’s true – of a Russian taxi driver, he drove […] a sleigh pulled 
by a horse […] He was one of those who helped transport military supplies […] [and] he 
found that they had overpaid him […] [and] he drove fifty miles to give back some, oh I 
don’t know, to give back fifteen rubles – some ridiculous amount like seventy five cents or 
a dollar and a half – he drove all this way to give it back.142 
 
The AEFNR’s contact with civilians made them reassess the character of the aggregate Russian 
people, and many came to appreciate Russian cultural values. 
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 Health, supply, training, combat, and Russian-American relations were key issues in the 
early months. These themes continued and impacted morale as the intervention dragged on. 
Despite unideal circumstances, the American reaction was not pronounced in the fall; they were an 
obedient force. The soldiers expressed dissatisfaction in their writing but conditions did not create 
mutinous sentiment. The Armistice depressed American morale. Defiant behavior largely began 
after November 1918 as the continued poor conditions, declining temperatures, further 
mistreatment at the hands of the British, and ultimately a lack of a coherent policy further 
undermined the fighting spirit of the AEFNR.  
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Photographs 
1.i: While Lauer’s photograph was taken in 1919, the foreign landscape the American encountered in September 
1918 was not drastically different. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Frank Lauer, “Archangel Waterfront”, Frank Lauer Papers. 
 
1.ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 28602, September 6, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL.  
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1.iii: “Company M, 339th Inf. after resting an hour, following the 17 hours [sic] march through the woods and 
swamps, set out again for the front. They are seen in this picture starting out along the railroad line. One of the 
armored cars use by the Allies is seen in the distance. Obozerskaya, Russia.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 28617, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL. 
 
1.iv: “Entrance to the 53rd Stationery hospital (English) in which a number of the American soldiers died from 
the Spanish influenza, soon after the arrival of the first American forces in Archangel. At present venereal cases 
are being treated in this hospital. Archangel, Russia.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 152761, December 9, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL.  
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Pvt. 1st Class, S. Paruszynski ૲Machine Gun Helper.
Pvt. L. A. Brown ૲Artillery Man, Gun No. 2.
Pvt. Cushing ૲Artillery Man, Gun No. 1.
Pvt. F. L. Dolmot ૲Machine Gun Helper.
Pvt. Wm. Martin૲Machine Gun Helper.
Pvt. Robert McGaugh ૲Machine Gun Helper.
Pvt. M. M. Manders ૲Artillery Man, Gun No. 2.
Pvt. J. B. Sutters ૲Machine Gun Helper.
Pvt. Parker૲Machine Gun Helper.
Pvt. Olsen૲Medical Detachment.
TRAIN CREW
Corp. T. F. Hughes ૲Engineer.
Pvt. 1st Class, Harry Blazy૲Fireman.
Pvt. Anthony Vart૲Wood-passer.
Corp. Roy Johnson ૲Conductor.
Corp. C. A. Cretsinger ૲Brakeman.
(Copyright Underwood & Underwood)
GUN CREW ON THE ARMOURED TRAIN
1.v: Americans on an armored train 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: John E. Wilson, The Arctic Antics of the North Russian Transportation Corps of the U.S. Army, 63. 
 
1.vi: “Line of natives of Archangel, Russia, waiting to get an allowance of bread. Military authorities provide the 
civil population who cannot get them otherwise, with certain articles of food. Archangel, Russia.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 34609, October 7, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL. 
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1.vii: “Russians preparing land for cultivation. Bakharitza, Russia.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 39242, September 6, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL. 
 
1.viii: “Russian woman with her horse and cart hauling supplies for soldiers. Bakharitza, Russia.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 39251, September 5, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL. 
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Chapter Two: A Crisis of Morale 
November 1918 – June 1919 
 
[We] are in danger of anihilation [sic], the old Russian 
bear is beginning to show her fangs1 
-Clarence Scheu 
 
Initially, fears over German ambitions in Russia motivated the soldiers.2 Multiple soldiers claimed 
evidence of German influence. Pvt. Arkins described an encounter with a wounded German-
speaking Bolshevik soldier and later attributed the efficacy of the Red fighting force to German 
leadership.3 In October, Ernest Andrews wrote of finding German ammunition and implied that 
German troops were in Russia: “[the town] had been stripped of their [sic] cushions by the 
Bolsheviks, I suppose for German use”.4 The November ceasefire undermined this rationale.  
Soldiers who had excitedly fought to end German ambitions in Russia felt demoralized on 
Armistice Day. Arkins, a firm believer in the German conspiracy who had proclaimed he was 
“glad and willing to share in this struggle against German Militarism” in Russia,5 wrote a poem 
the night of the Armistice: “On the Western Front, the firing has ceased; / No more will they fight 
against Prussia, / But here in the Winter, our danger’s increased, / For we are fighting in Russia”.6 
PFC William Lawson echoed Arkins: “When I hear of the boys in France getting ready to go 
home it sure makes me feel blue, I can picture you waiting and here we are fighting for another 
nation”.7 The AEFNR lusted for the jubilations across Europe and America: “We would have 
given anything we owned and mortgaged our every expectation to have been one of that great 
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delirious, riotous mob that surged over Paris on Armistice Day”.8 The ceasefire had effects on 
morale that surpassed the disappointment on Armistice Day. 
With the Germans out of the picture, soldiers were baffled by their continued presence in 
North Russia. The predicament left Sgt. Clark perplexed: “Sent to Archangel for the express 
purpose of guarding supplies, which did not exist, against the inroads of German forces, long since 
withdrawn”.9 YMCA worker Ralph Albertson visited the fronts shortly after the Armistice and 
summarized the sentiment: “Everywhere, on every occasion, I was asked […] “What are we here 
for?” “The Armistice is signed, why are we fighting?” “What have we against the Bolsheviki?””.10 
The Armistice also augmented the effects of preexisting conditions. 
 The doughboys had fought through ineffectual leadership, asymmetric weaponry 
allocations, harsh environmental conditions, inadequate supplies, and brutal violence. Despite 
these hardships, the Americans’ records were devoid of defiant sentiment before the Armistice. 
The ceasefire illuminated the lack of reasoning behind the campaign and furthered the erosion of 
American morale. The troops lamented their redirection from France to the icy woods of North 
Russia.11 C. B. Knight, in a letter to “The Stars and Stripes”, asked to be updated on the war in 
France, “where we belong”.12 The long exchange time of correspondences to and from Russia hurt 
morale, as men could go months without communication from home. The freezing of navigable 
waterways made these lengthy correspondences nonexistent in the winter months. 
Cold Weather 
In the fall and winter the doughboys often lodged outdoors and some fared without 
overcoats.13 Corpl. Salchow remembered how the dwindling hours of daylight added to the glum 
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tone of the expedition: “the land is so gloomy and grim […] long nights – and during the winter 
the days are three four hours maybe […] [and] it really never gets light. And you have an army up 
there […] who doesn’t know when they’re going to get out, it does something to them”.14 Several 
soldiers noted first snowfall in mid-October, but the fall of 1918 in North Russia was more rainy 
than snowy.15 This changed after the Armistice. In late March, Corpl. Riordan wrote that “one 
expression you frequently hear is, it’s snowing again boys. The snow has shown no disposition to 
melt yet”.16 Snow remained a constant during the expedition; one man noted snowy weather as 
late as June 12, two days before he left Russia.17 The deep snowbanks that began accumulating in 
the fall posed greater problems in the winter (Photograph 2.i). 
As the snow amassed throughout the winter, the campaign became even bleaker. Wounded 
men perished after only minutes in the freezing temperatures. The cold also had deleterious effects 
on men with preexisting conditions, leading one to remark how “in this climate a man with 
[pneumonia] has no chance to recuperate, they are nearly always casualties”.18 Even for Michigan 
boys the arctic conditions presented new extremes; Sgt. Francis George Robins remarked in 
March that “Michigan’s cold blizzards haven’t anything on this climate”.19 The shelling of enemy 
encampments, usually in the form of blockhouses, was core to both sides’ strategies and left 
soldiers to weather the arctic cold without shelter.20 Men, like PFC Lawson, complained about the 
cold even more than the war: “its [sic] not the bullets but it is the cold”.21 Frostbite became a 
common occurrence during patrols and heavy snowfall further shifted the odds in favor of the 
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defense.22 Nevertheless, neither Allied nor Bolshevik commanders ceased operations. Aggressive 
maneuvers in extreme weather often led to fatalities.  
The image of snow burned into some soldiers’ memories. Richard W. Ballensinger, a 
captain in “H” Company, described an offensive in his diary: “advancing in the face of heavy 
machine gun fire for about 500 yards through waist deep snow”.23 Corpl. Douma wrote a vivid 
account of the snow’s effect on morale in his diary:  
The snow was waist deep and the going was very hard. Was on patrol again last night. It 
was very realistic. Three towns were burning at one time and machine guns were popping 
on all sides […] The snow was awful. I am getting very worn out as are all the other boys. 
Tonight we are completely surrounded and cut off. Things look pretty dark and is [sic] we 
don’t get help we are done for. Still patrolling.24  
 
Even in interviews conducted in the 1970s, veterans dwelled on the snowy battlefields. Lawrence 
Montgomery recalled: “One morning, one Sunday morning, this was at Kodish, they call it the 
land of red snow […] fighting was mostly open […] so you just straight open fighting, and [snow] 
was just as red as they said it was”.25 Corpl. Salchow remembered: “you were in snow up to your 
waiste [sic], and you couldn’t even walk, let alone fight”.26 The snow had a clear impact on 
AEFNR morale and cold weather affected the men in other ways as well. 
The soldiers’ footwear was incredibly inadequate and ill-suited for snow. Many 
complained repeatedly about the Shackleton boots they had been issued (Photograph 2.ii). In 
Shenkursk in late January, after realizing that the Allies were outmanned and outgunned, military 
leadership ordered a daring nighttime retreat. The boots, designed by the famous British artic 
explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton, provided a warm boot that worked splendidly when standing 
completely still.27 Upon movement in the snow the boots became “rudderless skates”.28 During the 
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hasty retreat, the men “had to hike in our stockings because the road was too slippery for 
Shackelton boots,” resulting in cases of frostbite.29 So profound was the uselessness of the boots 
that they became the subject of a satirical poem by Jay Bonnell:  
I am the guy, I’m the giddy galeet, 
Who tried to chase in the Schackelton boot. 
Out of the house and into the street 
I find it not easy to keep on my feet, 
One step forward and two steps back, 
A sideslip, and down with a Hell of a thack. 
Up like a fairy, and forward I shoot 
All on account of the Schackelton boot.30 
 
The boots were such a disaster that they became a comical subject for Riordan too: “At reveille I 
can crawl out from under 12 or 15 blankets, dress in a room that has a temp. of 13 below, […] 
[and] slide down two flights of stairs in my Shackleton boots in three steps”.31 The traction-less 
boots seared into the memories of soldiers as a testament to the lack for foresight which 
characterized the expedition. Even as winter clothing arrived, the lack of available replacements 
left the doughboy’s clothing in poor shape. The local Russians produced “footgear a thousand 
times better” and many Americans bartered with locals or reused dead Bolshevik’s footwear.32 
The cold weather also altered the men’s experiences indirectly. 
The geographic location of Archangel slowed and eventually halted mail and medical33 
exchanges with the United States as the White Sea froze. The men treasured mail from home.34 
Corpl. Douma summarized the feeling: “It surely seems good to get mail. I wish we could get 
some every week”.35 As the ports became unnavigable the letters took longer to reach their 
destinations before halting completely. The soldiers grimly noted that important news from home 
                                                
29 BHL: Douma, “Diary”, 12 (1/23/19); Ryan, “Diary”, 23. 
30 BHL: Bonnell, “An Ode to the Schackelton Boot (By the one who tackled it)”, Jay H. Bonnell Papers. 
31 BHL: Riordan, 4. 
32 BHL: Primm, 88. 
33 Evacuation of injured and sick soldiers also slowed because of the frozen White Sea. Over one hundred evacuations occurred 
from September to December, yet only twenty-two unfit soldiers were evacuated in the winter months, and no soldiers left from 
February until June, in Moore, Mead, Jahns, 269. 
34 BHL: Parrish, 17; Lawson, “Russia, Somewhere”, (February 1919); Crissman, “Diary”, 5 (10/21/18); Skellenger, “Diary”, 10. 
35 BHL: Douma, “Diary”, 18 (4/2/19). 
50 
could take months to reach them: “Letters and papers are as a rule two months in reaching here 
from the Sates so you can see we are pretty remote from news”.36 Building on the ever-present 
difficult conditions, the absence of mail from loved ones ended the regular comforting 
correspondences the AEFNR cherished. The lack of communication brought about feelings of 
“hopelessness” in “complete isolation during the six months of winter”.37 The letters and diaries 
penned by the men of the AEFNR took a different tone during this time, especially in the 
treatment of their peers in the Allied armies. 
Experience in a Polyglot Army 
Despite some of the Polar Bears coming from immigrant families themselves, many of the 
Americans had never been part of a community as diverse as the multiethnic Allied armies.38 
American forces supplemented the Allied operation along several key fronts, often relieving weary 
French or British troops. For many the experience of serving alongside foreign men was a 
noteworthy experience (Photograph 2.iii). Men of the AEFNR had varied experiences within this 
multiethnic coalition but they unanimously hated the British. 
Acting as part of a great Allied coalition was a staple of World War I, and the question of 
American troop amalgamation proved a controversial point in Europe as well.39 General John J. 
Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF, opposed amalgamation because of how unpopular the 
move would be with American troops and civilians.40 While Pershing and his British counterparts 
eventually compromised, amalgamating a small amount of American troops into the British Army 
in exchange for trans-Atlantic transport services, the troops were for emergencies only and 
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American commanders could overrule their British equals.41 The situation in Russia was different, 
and the British commanded the entire operation to the chagrin of the AEFNR. Still, the diverse 
experience included more nationalities than just the British. 
American impressions of Russian soldiers were mostly negative. The AEFNR’s White 
Russian peers posed real dangers in combat and they were prone to desert.42 Counterrevolutionary 
Russians fought in several groups alongside the Americans: the Caucasian Cossack Regiment, the 
Russian National Army, and the Slavo-British Legion.43 The Russians continuously reflected their 
inability to use the artillery in a decisive manner, leading Lt. Ryan to lament that “[our] two 3” 
guns are jokes they are manned by Russians and hurt us more than they help”.44 Veteran Harry 
Costello echoed Lt. Ryan, remembering that White Russians “retarded rather than aided us. A 
number of desertions and acts of treachery are plainly traceable to these Russians”.45 On at least 
one occasion, Americans and White Russians had verbal confrontations.46 The atrocities 
committed by counterrevolutionary Russians forces, especially the Cossacks,47 unnerved some 
Americans like Pvt. Charles A. Simpson. Simpson observed the following: “When Russians 
finally took over river front, they captured quite a few “Bolos” in one battle. They cut hole in the 
ice and jam the live Bolos under ice,” leading Simpson to conclude that the “Russian people [had] 
no empathy”.48 As the winter dragged on, Russian soldiers became mutinous and the Polar Bears 
came to view them as a threat rather than an asset. 
The Americans became skeptical of their Russian peers after Russian National Army 
soldiers mutinied in December 1918 over food allowances. Lt. Ryan noted the mutiny and 
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rationalized that “the Russian has no liking for fighting, he came into the army to eat, not to 
fight”.49 The mutiny turned violent and was ended forcefully with executions: “Two [Russian] 
companies […] were given until two o'clock on the afternoon of December 11th to obey the order. 
Promptly at this time machine gun and rifle fire was directed against the building. British troops 
surrounded the building on three sides, while [American] Headquarters Company, 339th Infantry 
held the fourth” (Photograph 2.iv).50 Word spread of the mutiny among the Americans, many of 
whom argued that Bolsheviks had infected the White Russian ranks. Such claims are accurate. Lt. 
Costello believed that the Bolsheviks lured over White Russian fighters with their more abundant 
food stores and Historian Jonathan Smele confirmed his suspicion: Russian “men were rounded up 
and pressed into service, received their rations and uniforms, and then routinely disappeared back 
into the taiga”.51 As such, Smele argued that the Slavo-British Legion “is now chiefly remembered 
for all the wrong reasons – as the only unit of the civil war in which Russian conscripts mutinied 
against and then killed four of their British officers”.52 That was certainly the main takeaway of 
the AEFNR. Late in the expedition, Clarence Scheu remarked that he “would not give one ruble 
for the loyalty of the Russian Archangel troops under fire”.53 The numerous desertions, mutinies, 
and fighting skills of White Russians embittered many men. 
Conversely, American soldiers had positive opinions of their French and Canadian allies. 
Many Polar Bears respected the French soldiers they encountered: “They are great men – they 
seem as optimistic and jolly as can be, mostly always laughing and chatting along the streets but 
you can’t fail to notice that they are fighting men too”.54 Friendships between Americans and 
French soldiers blossomed as the men fought side by side and aided each other in desperate 
                                                
49 BHL: Ryan, “Diary” 61 (12/11/18). 
50 BHL: Print No. 152767, December 11, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL. 
51 BHL: Costello, 48; Smele, 134. 
52 Ibid. 
53 BHL: Scheu, 30 (4/3/19). 
54 BHL: Clay Schade, “Letter 2”, Clay Grimshaw Schade Papers, 1 (9/23/18). 
53 
situations during the expedition.55 The Americans also had good relations with their Canadian 
counterparts. An episode during the evacuation of Shenkursk represented the mutual comradery: a 
Canadian offered Pvt. Arkins, who was over-encumbered with heavy supplies, to carry some 
baggage on his horse. Arkins subsequently remarked: “Real guys, those Canadians”.56 Salchow 
echoed Arkins: “We were closer to the French than to any of the other – the French and the 
Canadians”.57 The Armistice created some tensions between the Americans and French due to 
higher rates of French mutinous behavior after the ceasefire, however.58 Still, the Americans and 
French agreed on their greater disdain for the British.59  
The AEFNR bore an almost unanimous contempt of the British.60 Captain Martin noted in 
an official report that “American and French troops were resentful of an immediate British 
command […] [the Americans] felt continually that they were taking orders from officers of 
another nationality”.61 The root of this sentiment developed initially from the early problems with 
supplies and medical attention and continued to deteriorate due to a perceived offhanded 
treatment, conspiracy allegations, and poor military planning. A lack of clarity from British 
command after the Armistice only added to the growing animosity. Such sentiment was not 
isolated to the North Russia expedition; many military planners of the AEF in France were also 
distrustful of the British, in one instance suspecting the British of falsifying supply data.62 
According to many American soldiers, the British misused their leadership position to force other 
                                                
55 Moore, Mead, Jahns, 234. 
56 BHL: Arkins, “Diary”, 23 (1/25/19). 
57 BHL: Salchow, 8. 
58 BHL: Colburn, “Article from the Literary Digest, July 12, 1919”, 2. 
59 Halliday, Kindle Location 1520/4001; Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Report of Capt H.S. Martin, American Military 
Mission, on his Personal Observations Concerning the American Intervention in North Russia, Aug 20, 1919”, 7. 
60 BHL: Jay Spaulding, “Diary”, Jay Earle Spaulding Papers, 21; Moore, Mead, Jahns, 17. 
61 Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Report of Capt H.S. Martin, American Military Mission, on his Personal Observations 
Concerning the American Intervention in North Russia, Aug 20, 1919”, 7; Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Brig. Gen. 
Wilds P Richardson’s “Notes on the War and on the North Russian Expedition”, n.d.”, 51. 
62 Kennedy, 176. 
54 
nationalities into the intense combat while providing meager supplies, creating “a live enemity 
[sic] between English and Americans”.63  
As was the case with the lack of proper supplies, military operations were often poorly 
planned. Countless attacks failed due to a deficiency of guides and poor leadership resulting in a 
lack of coordination between forces. Several British officers were known to show up drunk to 
military maneuvers.64 British commanders’ misguided attack plans increased casualties and 
increasingly drove a wedge between the Americans and the British, resulting in huge losses of 
morale. To supplement the lack of planning the British architects of the expedition, initially 
General Poole and later General Edmund Ironside, and their subordinates repeatedly organized 
risky maneuvers. Lt. Ryan repeatedly criticized British plans, calling one proposed flank 
maneuver “suicide” and another “a reckless proposition”.65 The latter plan ended with the 
Americans’ cover being blown and Ryan forcing a retreat under intense shelling.66 Further 
encounters with drunk and or rude British officers led Ryan to label them “pigheaded and stupid” 
and one egregiously rude Brit “a regular ass”.67 Tensions boiled over to the point that many 
American officers refused to mess with their British counterparts and Lt. Ryan claimed, near 
Kodish, that they “would rather walk to Archangel, than stay here [with the British officers] any 
longer”.68 Some reasons for the unanimous distaste for the British may have predated the British 
handling of the intervention. 
Some AEFNR men were skeptical of Britain’s colonial past, class hierarchy, and misuse of 
Wilson’s policy. First Lieutenant Cudahy referenced Britain’s imperialist tendencies to argue that 
the “war with Russia was in fact a typical British show, conducted by that conquering people who 
have spread the dominions of the mother country to every shore of the far seas […] [with] all of 
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the muddling, blundering, and fuddling […] that are forever British”.69 Some, like Corporal 
Salchow, attributed part of the enmity to the hierarchical nature of the British Army: “There was a 
feeling of antagonism between our troops and the British. Well, the British somehow still had this 
class system where they would hardly talk to an enlisted man unless it were to give him orders”.70 
In an interview decades later, Lawrence Montgomery responded to the interviewer’s question: 
“How many [soldiers] did the British have?” “Don’t make a difference; they didn’t go up to the 
front anyway”.71 Cudahy, Salchow, and Montgomery emphasized the issues the AEFNR had with 
their British commanders. Out of the Anglo-American hostility came stories, widespread amongst 
the Americans, which border on being conspiracy theories. 
Several suspected the British of conspiracy, accusing them of gaming the ruble currency 
markets and plotting to exploit North Russia’s lumber endowment.72 A widely known story among 
American troops consisted of the British Col. Sutherland ordering an artillery strike on an Allied-
held bridge. Allegedly, after being notified of his mistake, he first called for a refill of whiskey 
before extending the range of the strike.73 The fractured relationship caused Americans to strike 
back, engaging in small acts of thievery with British supplies, usually in the form of stealing 
alcohol.74 The anti-British sentiment lingered with some. During an interview sixty years later, 
veteran Levi Bartels confirmed: “Talk about England! I’ve always said that if we start a war with 
England tomorrow morning I’ll be there”.75  
Ultimately, Anglo-American friction hurt the intervention drastically. Captain Martin 
argued that “the ordinary American will never show an enthusiastic military spirit while serving 
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under the immediate command of a foreign officer – particularly the British. Unfortunately our 
national characteristics cannot always be depended on to harmonize […] [the] expedition lacked 
that unity of spirit which might have brought forth more favorable results”.76 The uncooperative 
Allied forces struggled in the winter, as the newly organized Bolshevik armies posed a greater 
challenge. 
Bolshevik Fighting Ability and Post-Armistice Engagements 
 The Bolsheviks, who initially seemed to be a disorderly and ineffectual fighting force, 
soon turned into a formidable foe in the eyes of the AEFNR. Early on the Bolsheviks retreated 
when under the threat of an Allied advance and the Americans controlled large portions of the 
province with minimal casualties. The post-Armistice Bolshevik armies launched lethal 
offensives, some of which resulted in Bolshevik victories, and fiercely resisted Allied attacks. 
While the Red Army was officially created in December 1917, Trotsky redesigned the ineffectual 
Bolshevik forces in the summer of 1918. The improved Bolshevik combat abilities noted by the 
AEFNR were due to organizational efficiency as well as material advantages; Smele highlighted 
that the “coordinating organs of the Red Army” were developed in September and November 
1918.77 The American soldiers realized the growing threat posed by their enemy as they fought 
deadly battles in the winter while wondering why they were in Russia at all. The shifting 
momentum of the intervention heightened criticism of their leaders and decreased morale.  
 Clarence Scheu, of “B” Company, fought in the Armistice Day battle at Toulgas and his 
opinions of the Bolshevik combatants, along with his confidence in the expedition, shifted because 
of the engagement. Scheu and his company arrived in Toulgas on October 15 and began fortifying. 
Constant shelling, aimed at the American blockhouses for the coming winter, put pressure on the 
                                                
76 Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Report of Capt H.S. Martin, American Military Mission, on his Personal Observations 
Concerning the American Intervention in North Russia, Aug 20, 1919”, 8. 
77 Smele, 77-85. 
57 
men and instilled fear; Scheu remarked: “we all have a profound respect for their field pieces”.78 
They raced to build trenches and blockhouses while patrolling to detect attacks (Photograph 2.v). 
Such attacks occurred regularly the week before the Armistice and Scheu lamented: “their actions 
seem to indicate confidence in themselves now, but which they did not display when we were on 
the offensive in the early fall, the further they retired in our early fall advance, the stronger they 
became, and now, flushed with their victory at Selso, they are going to push us back into the 
White Sea”.79 The Bolsheviks attacked in force on November 11, Armistice Day:  
the enemy suddenly lauch [sic] attack on our front, our immediate right, simultaneously 
with an attack in our rear, their gunboats and field pieces pounding our positions 
continuously, […] battle raging all day […] at 1 p.m. our machine gunner was killed as I 
was helping him reload, a sniper got Kooyers as he was firing out a porthole, a while later a 
bullet split my gun in two, rendering it useless, thier [sic] shells were landing so close [to 
the blockhouse] that they loosened the logs and covered our front porthole80 
 
The fighting kept up overnight, and Scheu and his peers in the blockhouse were not as lucky the 
next day: “[artillery] made a direct hit on [blockhouse] roof, we were thrown together by 
concussion, 3 men killed and 5 wounded, out of a total of 9, a piece of shell went in my hand and 
shoulder”.81 Scheu, wounded and dazed, managed to escape the destroyed blockhouse and crawled 
to a nearby house, where he witnessed a sad sight: “the priest was decapitated and the entire 
family killed outside of a little girl, […] others were lying there seriously wounded, […] another 
shell hit the building as we [lay] huddled together”.82 Scheu was evacuated to the nearby 
Beresnick, where he was informed of an Allied victory on November 15. 
Scheu’s detailed account illustrated the ferocity of Bolshevik attacks after the Armistice. 
The engagement had a psychological component, reminding the men of “B” and “D” Companies 
that the Armistice had no bearing in North Russia.83 According to a brief history of the expedition 
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compiled by the Polar Bear Expedition Digital Collections, the battle at Toulgas “marked the 
beginning of a decline in American morale”.84 Despite sustaining heavily casualties, the 
Americans had won the battle at Toulgas. Subsequent Bolshevik winter victories had even more 
deleterious effects on morale. 
 Sgt. Crissman fought the Bolsheviks at Ust-Padenga and Shenkurst in late January, 1919. 
The engagement began on January 19:  
Enemy opened up Artillery fire at 6:30 AM and continued all day. They attacked us from 
all sides. Our outpost at Ninji Gora was fired upon at daybreak and shortly after were 
surrounded and had to retreat […] Out of 43 men there were 32 casualties […] They 
continued firing all day and in the afternoon they fired on our billets with rifle and MG. Its 
[sic] a real war now.85 
 
During the engagement Crissman observed gruesome violence, with a peer being decapitated by 
an artillery shell.86 Red artillery greatly impacted the AEFNR: “Shelling all day long with a little 
rifle fire. This shelling is getting the best of everybody”.87 The shelling prompted a retreat from 
Ust-Padenga, the furthest the Allies would ever advance, to Shenkursk under the cover of 
darkness: “at 1:10 AM we left Ust Padenga under fire. The Bolos were right after us. They opened 
Artillery fire but could not locate us. We had to leave one piece of Artillery on the road. We hiked 
all night”.88 Crissman and his comrades arrived in Shenkursk at 5pm on January 25 and had to 
retreat again that day: “About 11 PM we were told to get ready to leave, carrying nothing but 
overcoat, rations, gun and belt […] All our things were left in Shenkursk, and all we have is what 
is on our backs”.89 The defeat had a negative impact on Crissman’s, and American, morale: 
“Begins to look as if we were to stay here a while and not on our way home as we thought”.90 As 
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the Bolsheviks gained momentum, the Allies turned to destructive scorched-earth methods to slow 
the advancing enemy forces. Such methods also had a harmful effect on morale. 
 Bolshevik military successes pushed the Allies to more brutal tactics, and the burning of 
towns resonated with the American soldiers as they reassessed the morality of the intervention.91 
On November 15, Sgt. Parrish and his men were ordered to burn a small town near Toulgas. After 
taking enemy prisoners, they proceeded to light the houses on fire: “we took 16 enemy prisoners 
and killed 2 then we burned the village and my heart ached to have [a] woman fall down at my 
feet and grab my legs to kiss my hand and beg me [not] to do it.”92 1st Lt. Cudahy wrote critically 
of these Allied tactics after the war:  
Friendly intervention? All too vividly comes to mind a picturing during the Allied 
occupation of Archangel province […] Military necessity demanded that another village far 
up the Dvina be destroyed. As the soldiers, with no keen appetite for the heartless job, cast 
the peasants out of the homes where they had lived their uncouth, but not unhappy lives, 
the torch was set to their houses […] Why had we come and why did we remain, invading 
Russia and destroying Russian homes?93 
 
The incident near Toulgas was no isolated incident. Under British orders, American soldiers also 
burned the town of Kodish in January and observed Cossacks burning Shenkursk after their 
retreat.94 The destruction of civilian property, only to deny its use for the Bolsheviks, undermined 
the principles many of the AEFNR had arrived with, eroding the sense of righteousness in an 
expedition that already “had no idealism […] a free-booter’s excursion, depraved and lawless”.95 
The battles at Ust-Padenga and Shenkursk and subsequent scorched-earth tactics hurt American 
morale after the Armistice. 
 As the winter cold set in, Allied commanders pursued a defensive course of action. 
Knowing the terrain, the Bolsheviks opted for several strategic offensives. The Bolsheviks 
attacked with superior artillery and manpower advantages: “sometimes I wonder, why this 
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expedition? One man has to do the fighting of ten, and we can’t replace men when they fall”.96 
The Americans correctly assessed that the Bolsheviks they fought before the Armistice were less 
organized and effective than those in the winter and spring. Some of the Americans felt 
disappointed in their failure in combat. Much of that blame was assigned to the British officers 
and the head of the American military in North Russia. 
Confused Leadership, Declining Morale 
Morale reached new lows as the Bolsheviks continued to make decisive gains. Universally, 
the men noted poor morale and many officers sued for relief. The predicament was no secret; 
Capt. Martin declared in an official report: “The morale of the American troops likewise 
underwent a steady decline after the signing of the Armistice”.97 The unimpressive leadership by 
Colonel Stewart, American Consul DeWitt C. Poole,98 and the British commanders did little in the 
form of offering explanations to alleviate this. In a December lecture, Poole attempted to explain 
the reasoning behind the conflict only to conclude the lack thereof: “talk by Mr. Poole […] His 
subject of course was “Russia, why are we here”, the substance of this lecture was this: “we’re 
here, because we’re here”.99 This can partially be explained by the fact that the respective 
American and British governments were even more confused by the winter of 1918-1919 than 
they had been when they dispatched the expedition. The AEFNR wondered what they were 
fighting for as their AEF peers celebrated at home. The intervention’s ambiguity had a disastrous 
impact on morale. Self-inflicted wounds (SIWs) and mutinous behavior surged as a result. 
Some noticed an uptick in wounds to the hands or feet and thought them to be suspicious 
after the Armistice. Lt. Ryan, after initially holding the inferior Russian rifles responsible for 
SIWs, later suspected that the wounds were self-inflicted to avoid further combat and had to 
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“investigate about 10 cases of suspicious wounds”.100 Medic Lt. Katz also became suspicious after 
observing six “cases of self-inflicted wounds” in six days, “[some of which] seemed 
intentional”.101 John P. Clock bluntly remembered the situation years later: “And Taylor had an 
SIW, self-inflicted wound, see? He shot his finger off to keep out of the fight”.102 SIWs were only 
one of the post-Armistice themes which reflected declining morale. 
Collapsing morale resulted in mutinous activity. The first of such instances occurred in 
February and prompted discussions of court-martials for mutiny. Sgt. Silver Parrish led a group of 
“B” Company men to draft a resolution demanding explanations before they would fight, resulting 
in threats of court-martials. The resolution set a date on the demand for a cessation of fighting:  
after this date we […] refuse to advance on the Bolo lines […] in view of the fact that our 
object in Russia has been accomplished and having duely [sic] acquitted our selfs [sic] bye 
[sic] doing every thing that was in our power [and was asked] of us after 6 months of 
frequent and uncomplaining sacrifice after serious debate arrive at this [sic] conclusions 
and it is not considered unpatriotic103 
 
Sixty-six enlisted men signed the document in agreement.104 Despite this behavior, no “action was 
ever taken in the case”.105 Officers attributed the document to a disadvantage in artillery compared 
to the Bolshevik forces, but the petition had other implications.106 The document penned by “B” 
Company emphasized that the Armistice annulled their presence in Russia: “we have 
accomplished the defeat of the Germans which was our mission and whereas further activity 
means interference in the affairs of the Russian people with whom we have no quarrel”.107 The “B” 
Company petition was the first recorded instance of mutinous behavior and directly stemmed from 
the Armistice. A more egregious event occurred a month later.  
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On March 30, 1919, the members of “I” Company relaxed in Archangel. They had been 
away from the front for several days now and had time to think. Lingering questions, reiterated by 
Bolshevik propaganda, about their presence in Russia echoed around the barracks. Anger over the 
mistreatment by the British and the dwindling odds of military success against the surging 
Bolshevik forces boiled to the surface. A sergeant entered the station with orders to pack up for 
another trip to the front, to which the American soldiers refused. The sergeant reported to an 
officer, who “had to talk with [the men] for some time before they would stir. Even when they did 
so reluctantly and in a very bad spirit and one man continued to stand still”.108 Tensions flared as 
the troops demanded answers for their role in the conflict. The officer appealed to Col. Stewart 
who, in an uncharacteristic display of leadership, corralled the soldiers who packed up their 
belongings and headed to the front in high spirits. The soldiers repelled a fierce Bolshevik attack 
on the front line several days later.109 A multitude of firsthand accounts and hysterical reporting by 
the American media complicated the validity of the “I” Company mutiny. 
Rumors of the “mutiny” spread in the American press. The New York Times claimed that 
“the refusal of troops at Archangel to go back to the front has no parallel since the mutiny of some 
starving Continentals in 1781” and publicized that “relatives of the men in the 339th Infantry […] 
appealed to the War Department for leniency in dealing with American soldiers who mutinied 
March 30”.110 Many AEFNR men subsequently detested that the media “has caused a unit of 
Detroit men to be branded as mutineers throughout the world”.111  
The men of the AEFNR recorded varied accounts of the March 30 events. Despite several 
noting the events as a “mutiny” on March 30, most, like Pvt. McKenzie, amended their claims 
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later on: “I Co.’s reputed mutiny all bunk”.112 Upon returning home the soldiers disputed the  
label, citing the fact that “no one was ever courtmartialed [sic] for mutiny”.113 Some proposed that 
the soldier who defied orders after the officer arrived was a recent immigrant who spoke poor 
English.114 Several veterans cited a report from Brigadier General Wildst Preston Richardson who 
wrote that he “found, upon arrival later at Archangel [in April 1919], that the conditions had been 
somewhat exaggerated, especially in respect to the alleged mutiny”.115 As such, the label is 
controversial. Despite the veterans of “I” Co. claiming that “we kicked like Hell but we didn’t 
mutiny,” the events illustrated deteriorated fighting spirit.116 Sgt. Colburn, who served in “I” Co., 
linked the cause to confused leadership: “It should be noted here that Colonel Stewart did not 
explain why Americans were fighting in Russia. The Colonel could not explain this, because he 
himself did not know, He had asked the authorities in Washington and they couldn’t tell him”.117 
Colburn was not alone in his assessment, and this trend was pervasive beyond “I” Company. 
The AEFNR’s leadership had a negative effect on morale. In France too, Kennedy argued 
that “American resentment of martial authority could be found in all ranks”.118 Sgt. Clark penned a 
long essay titled “What Ails the A.N.R.E.F.?” that detailed these issues in Russia. Clark proposed 
that the British high command and behavior of both British and American officers created the 
present conditions. He alleged that officers took nicer accommodations and food for themselves, at 
the expense of the men. Clark utilized even stronger language, calling the officers “liars, whore-
mongers, booze-fighters, who absolutely fear to venture near the front, much less under fire, 
knowing certainly that a well deserved bullet in the back would be the messenger of justice and 
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death upon their first appearance”.119 While Clark’s opinion of the “gilded aristocracy of British 
and American officers” is extreme, similar emotions pervaded the enlisted men and exacerbated 
the situation in North Russia after the Armistice.120 Clark was not alone in these sentiments; 1st Lt. 
Cudahy also echoed the overuse of supplies at the expense of enlisted men.121 While some soldiers 
proposed that AEFNR leadership was a key catalyst of morale problems, these claims largely 
appeared after the Armistice.122 Instead, poor conditions and propaganda intensified the soldiers’ 
preexisting attitudes toward their officers. The leader of the American military in Archangel bore 
the brunt of this criticism, but the blame trickled down to lower ranking officers. 
Colonel Stewart and his officers ineffectually led the American military in North Russia. It 
is significant that Stewart, a colonel, was the highest-ranking American in North Russia until the 
arrival of Brigadier General Richardson in April 1919. The enlisted men portrayed Stewart as a 
cowardly leader who preferred to lead from the comforts of Archangel.123 The Americans resented 
how British officers outranked all American officers and blamed Stewart for his lack of zeal in 
defending them. Stewart was not solely culpable, however. Some veterans remembered Major 
Young’s ineffectual leadership and recalled a Polar Bear reunion where someone hit the major in 
the head with a projectile brick.124 While in Russia, Lt. Ryan noted the struggles of an unnamed 
American major: “an American major is like the 5th wheel to the wagon”.125 Even official 
dispatches criticized some officers: “I have never come into contact with a more disgruntled, 
discouraging set than I found in the officers of [“D” Company] […] [one] is the poorest specimen 
of an officer I have ever seen. I am convinced that he […] has done more, wherever he has been, 
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to lower the morale of our troops”.126 As such, morale problems can be attributed to the American 
military leadership as an intensifying factor at minimum.  
Leisure Time 
During the spring, many American soldiers retreated toward the relative safety of 
Archangel as the rumored Bolshevik offensive failed to materialize. Instead of preparing defenses 
and fighting Bolsheviks, the AEFNR had spare time. This free time had dual effects, improving 
morale through sports and YMCA-organized activities but also allotting time for thinking. In some 
cases, spare time may have accentuated morale problems rather than alleviating them as the men 
reflected on the intervention. Still, enjoyable activities comprised a large share of this time. 
Those remaining near the front lines graciously welcomed relief from the intense violence 
and found ways to pass the time. Boxing, tug of war, basketball, baseball, theatrical productions, 
sledding, gambling, bathing in the Russian baths, and films helped the Americans pass the time as 
they waited to withdraw (Photographs 2.vi & 2.vii).127 The men found innovative ways to expand 
on other games, including a “blindfolded [boxing match] between Private Guthrie and myself” and 
a “Stripping & assembling contest”.128 Russia also presented opportunities for outdoorsmen 
including hiking, fishing, and hunting. As Sgt. Crissman relaxed near Archangel in May he 
remarked: “Nothing much to do […] Hunt duck and play base ball [sic] quite often”.129 The men 
invented a novel fishing method with their ample time: “I have been fishing 2 times instead of 
throwing my grenades at Bolos I am throwing them at fish”.130 As the manpower needs on the 
front waned due to the shift in strategy, many soldiers had opportunities to visit Archangel for 
training. 
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Archangel, the city housing the polyglot armies’ headquarters and the White Russian 
capital of North Russia, offered ample opportunities for the soldiers to blow off steam. The 
experience of Pvt. McKenzie, who spent much time in Archangel due to sickness, was emblematic 
of the city. McKenzie spent his time between the library, YMCA, Church, lectures, dances, and 
movies, where he went on dates with local Russian and American girls.131 Soldiers who visited the 
city for wounds, rest, or training had similar experiences.132 Corpl. Colburn, on a January visit, 
had a typical Archangel experience: “Met nice Drasky (Drozhka) girl”, “Went to dance at the 
convalescent hospital” and “went to Edison Theater to see Russian movie”.133 Not all activities in 
Archangel were appreciated by the American military commanders.  
Prostitution and excessive drinking were commonplace in the city.134 Clarence Scheu 
described the experience of his first, and only, trip to the city since landing in September 1918: 
“Managed to get a pass and slipped to Archangel, met canadian [sic] friend who came up with 
relief forces, had lots of rum, we celebrated all night”.135 Lawrence Montgomery jokingly prided 
himself on his actions in Archangel: “we was the best whiskey stealers there was […] the old 
captain came up to the front and he took Mac and I. He knew if there was whiskey in Archangel, 
we’d get it”.136 Drunken antics were not confined to Archangel; alcoholism appeared a unanimous 
thread amongst the Allied soldiers. The soldiers wrote tales of drunkenness, stealing British 
alcohol, and on some occasions fighting the Bolsheviks while drunk.137 The arrival of the adored 
YMCA provided alternatives to drunken debauchery. 
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The YMCA proved instrumental in organizing activities to stave off boredom, improving 
morale as a result.138 The organization coordinated films and theater, food and refreshments, and 
lectures and Russian classes.139 The YMCA building in Archangel had a piano, to the delight of 
some men: “The YMCA here is a dandy […] They give a lot of entertainments and have a good 
piano”.140 The YMCA was based in Archangel but had satellites in other population centers in 
North Russia, such as Shenkursk, Emetskoe, and Onega. These outposts boosted spirits amongst 
the men on the front lines: “Arrived at Emetskoe and saw our first Y.M.C.A. They gave us some 
hot cocoa and cookie which surely made a hit with us”.141 The organization also played a role in 
organizing holiday celebrations. With the help of the YMCA and American Red Cross, many 
soldiers feasted on the best food they had had in months on Thanksgiving and Christmas.142 The 
organization not only provided food to the hungry and demoralized men, it also made soldiers 
think of home. Pvt. Rasmussen described the feeling: “I am doing two things at once this 
afternoon, sitting in the Y.M.C.A. room writing this letter and listening to the phonograph which 
makes us feel at home”.143 As Rasmussen alluded, some men reflected on homesickness and other 
aspects of their situation during leisure time.  
Free time gave the men of the AEFNR space to contemplate the expedition. Sgt. Clark, 
who penned the long essay on AEFNR morale issues, wrote the piece in May while away from the 
front. The late March “I” Company mutiny also occurred in Archangel as the company, which was 
on leave, was ordered back to the front. The variety of accounts of the “mutiny” commonly 
described that the men had been discussing their situation before refusing to return to the front. 
Ironically, spare time in the spring of 1919 gave the AEFNR time to debate their predicament and 
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to read Bolshevik propaganda. As American media reached the men in letters from home, they 
also had time to read about the domestic controversy over the intervention in the spring. As such, 
leisure time provided an opportunity to digest the expedition and indirectly hurt morale.  
¨  ¨ ¨ ¨ 
The Armistice marked a shift in momentum in North Russia. After the ceasefire, the 
Americans found themselves in a country with which the United States was not at war. They 
fought in the cold, outmanned and outgunned, under detested British officers.144 Stewart and the 
AEFNR officers, who were unaware themselves of the policy, did little to clarify the situation as 
the subsequent morale crisis unfolded. Defiant activity, whatever the label, illustrated collapsed 
American fighting spirit. The exacting conditions were not the only forces wearing down the men. 
The AEFNR was also besieged by British and Bolshevik propaganda and demoralizing news from 
home. The Bolshevik propaganda, which initially seemed ridiculous, gained credibility as it posed 
answers to questions that American officers and Stewart could not themselves answer. The 
Armistice magnified the poor conditions, present since September, and in the spring the men had 
time to read Bolshevik propaganda and American newspapers. Ultimately, these reading materials 
proved a critical amplifier in the collapse of morale.  
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Photographs 
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2.ii: Shackleton boots 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 161115, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL in BHL: Primm, 88. 
Source: BHL: Print No. 161113, 
February 21, 1919, US Army Signal 
Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL. 
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2.iii: “Russian, English, and Cossack soldiers, crew of one of the armored cars. Obozerskaya, Russia” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 32067, September 24, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL. 
 
2.iv: “Groups of Russian soldiers leaving Alexandria Barracks to surrender to American and British troops who 
had fired on the building when the Russians had mutinied” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 152770, December 11, 1918, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL 
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2.v: “A blockhouse and dugout now in course of construction surrounded by barbed wire […] When completed 
it will be equipped with a Vikers machine gun. One non-commissioned officer, two Vikers men and six privates 
will be on duty. Visorka Gora, Ust Padenga, Front, Vaga River Column, Russia.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 152822, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL 
 
2.vi: “Men of Company A, 339th Infantry, watching a boxing bout in their quarters. Boxing has been one of the 
chief forms of amusement during the long winter evenings […] [near] Ust Padenga” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Print No. 152820, January 7, 1919, US Army Signal Corps Photograph Collection, UMBHL 
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FOURTH OF JULY SPORTS
SOME LIVELY BOUTS WERE STAGED ON JULY FOURTH
Our visitors who are unaccustomed to brutality (?) thought they were "neat dobra"
SPAR FIGHTING JULY FOURTH
This soldier had successfully met all comers until an American Tar appeared on
the scene with the above results
 
2.vii: July 4, 1919: Photo taken near Soroka, the base for the Transportation Corps, who served over North 
Russia to work on railroads for tactical purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: John Wilson, The Arctic Antics of the North Russian Transportation Corps of the U.S. Army, Hathi Trust 
Digital Library, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015071183761, 55. 
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Chapter Three: Propaganda & American Media 
 
There was an assault from within and without our lines by insidious  
propaganda as well as the usual weapons of warfare1 
-Lt. Harry Costello 
 
American soldiers faced adversity in North Russia. This fact was noted by their commanding 
officers and also by the enemy, who sought to use circumstances to their advantage. Bolshevik 
propaganda targeted English-speakers as well as the numerous Slavic Americans in the AEFNR in 
an organized drive to demoralize Allied troops. Colonel Stewart, in a February report, highlighted 
how the Bolshevik propaganda played into the larger narrative of American discontent: “[the] 
American troops constitute the bulk of the actual fighting forces, a fact which has been taken 
advantage of by the Bolshevists”.2 Stewart noted the double-pronged effect of such propaganda: it 
both garnered Russian civilian distrust of the Americans as the materials “assert that the Allied 
expedition was inspired by American capitalism” and called attention to the issues fanning Anglo-
American tensions.3 Although ineffective at first, both the Allies and Bolsheviks honed their 
propaganda techniques over the span of the intervention. 
The usage of propaganda during the Great War was not peculiar to North Russia.4 Peter 
Kenez, in a detailed study of the developing Soviet propaganda state, focused on intervention era 
Bolshevik propaganda. He stated that as “we have no precise definition” of propaganda, such 
analysis “must accept the broadest possible definition: Propaganda is nothing more than an 
attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, 
and thereby behavior”.5 By this definition, both the Allies and the Bolsheviks used propaganda 
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extensively during the WWI era. In the U.S., the Wilson administration launched a campaign to 
convince the public of the war cause and combat years of anti-war sentiment. Contemporary 
Americans realized the trending propaganda usage; Walter Lippmann’s 1922 Public Opinion 
expanded on the increasingly large role of propaganda by arguing that modern society had become 
too complex for everyday people to fully understand.6 During the intervention, the Bolsheviks 
continued to experiment with “new and unconventional methods” to disseminate and construct 
propaganda aimed at Russian civilians and the Allied invaders.7 The Americans in North Russia 
found themselves directly in the crosshairs of these new realities of modern society and warfare. 
The American media inadvertently influenced the AEFNR experience and negatively 
impacted morale. Unlike in France, the intervention was widely derided by American politicians, 
citizens, and advocates of Bolshevik ideology. Domestic media, in the form of newspaper 
clippings and news of the controversy, reached the AEFNR through letters from home. Such 
media deleteriously affected morale by raising awareness of the domestic unpopularity of the 
intervention and intensifying confusion over its goals. 
This chapter explores the experience of Americans fighting in North Russia with specific 
attention to the role propaganda and the American media played in the conflict. British and 
Bolshevik factions attempted to influence the AEFNR’s perceptions of the political climate and 
their ideological beliefs. The conditions discussed in Chapters One and Two provided a powder 
keg of distrust and skepticism, and propaganda exploited the situation to sow discontent. While 
several officers preferred to believe “that the men of the 339th were also immune to Allied [and 
Bolshevik] propaganda,” the records of enlisted men paint a different picture.8 American media 
had an even more prominent impact, further eroding patriotic confidence in the expedition and 
questioning its purpose. 
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British Propaganda  
 The Allied operations in North Russia confronted British command with a problem from 
the outset. Before British Brigadier General William Edmund Ironside took control of the 
intervention, General Poole commanded the Allied forces. With British, Canadian, Australian, 
Serbian, Polish, American, French, and White Russian troops under his command, Poole believed 
that he needed to unify his fighting force. Consistent with his disdain for non-British troops and 
the lingering British-imperialist sentiment noted by the AEFNR, Poole used fear-mongering 
propaganda to attempt to unite the factions.  
The British effort was three-pronged, aiming to convince Russians of the Allies’ good 
intent, keep Russian civilians from joining the ranks of the Reds, and bolster Allied fighting spirit. 
At Poole’s suggestion, the British military in Archangel spread disinformation in an attempt to 
demonize the Bolsheviks.9 British propaganda highlighted purported rape, murder, and torture at 
the hands of the Bolsheviks while appealing to anti-German and anti-Semitic inclinations.10  
British stories recounting Bolshevik atrocities appeared in the writings of American 
soldiers.11 Poole regularly published and disseminated materials to the Allied battalions 
emphasizing “dubious atrocity stories” and Bolshevik cooperation with the Germans.12 Some 
veterans recalled one of Poole’s published orders: “The enemy. Bolsheviks. There are soldiers and 
sailors who, in the majority of cases, are criminals […] Their natural, vicious brutality enabled 
them to assume leadership […] The Germans usually appear in Russian uniform and are 
impossible to distinguish”.13 The veterans also noted the aims of, and their disdain for, such 
memos: “The writer remembers the sense of shame that seized him as he reluctantly read a general 
order to his troops, a British piece of propaganda, that recited gruesome atrocities by the 
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Bolsheviks, a recital that was supposed to make the American soldiers both fear and hate the 
enemy”.14 The Americans realized the British propaganda’s deceit as the campaign continued. 
The British propaganda aimed to demonize the Bolsheviks but had negative ripple effects. 
Officers Moore, Mead, and Jahns recognized that mutilations of Americans did occur, but “it was 
not one-tenth as prevalent a practice by the Bolos as charged” and that by the end of the campaign, 
as the enemy turned into an effective fighting force, the mutilations all but disappeared.15 
Ironically, the stories created negative backlashes that decreased Allied fighting prowess. Some 
Americans recalled that Allied soldiers became so afraid of Bolshevik atrocities that they would 
rather commit suicide than be left to the Reds: “Cossack Colonel, it is rumored, kills himself when 
surrounded by Bolsheviks”.16 Tales of Bolshevik war crimes also inspired American retribution. 
In his diary, Sgt. Edward Trombley summarized the prevailing feeling: “God knows [the 
Bolsheviks] deserve no mercy the way they mutilate and torture our men”.17 Ralph Albertson, a 
YMCA worker, noted that American officers commanded their men “to take no prisoners, to kill 
them even if they came in unarmed”.18 Rhodes emphasized that, later on, many “found that the 
accusations [of Bolshevik atrocities] were mostly groundless, and [there was] no evidence that the 
Bolsheviks shot prisoners as did the Allies”.19 By matching the Bolshevik cruelty alleged by 
British propaganda and then realizing its dishonesty, the British memos inadvertently decreased 
morale by undermining the morality of the expedition and aggravating Anglo-American distrust. 
Rather than unifying the Allies, Poole’s strategy eroded feelings of Allied unity among the 
Americans and spurred demoralizing atrocities. As the expedition progressed, Americans grasped 
that the British claims were exaggerated or unfounded. Lee Ward revealed his suspicions in a 
letter: “we hear all kinds of rumors […] and we can’t believe a thing we hear and only half what 
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we see”.20 Halliday also noted that, once the men realized the nature of British propaganda, it 
made the soldiers angry and suspicious: the “British War Office methods of stimulating 
enthusiasm in the campaign against the Bolsheviki was a miserable failure”.21 The British 
propaganda spurred American Major J. Brooks Nichols to protest directly to the British 
commanders to end their propaganda effort.22 Ironside noted Poole’s failure as he assumed 
command, ending the development of new propaganda materials and ceasing distribution in 
October 1918.23 American materials were different, as domestic media constituted the most 
effectual source of discontent among the AEFNR.  
American Propaganda and Media 
 American media and propaganda greatly influenced the AEFNR. The sole source of 
American propaganda, by Kenez’s definition, was The American Sentinel, a newspaper published 
for the AEFNR in Archangel. Domestic media impacted the AEFNR more so. This media, in the 
form of official memos, newspaper clippings, letters, and petitions from home, furthered the decay 
of American morale more than all foreign forms of propaganda, according to several officers’ 
estimates. 
The American Sentinel, a weekly periodical concerning matters ranging from Russia to the 
Western Front to the United States, was a key source of information for the American soldiers and 
presented a biased viewpoint.24 Sgt. George Robins mentioned the paper in a letter home: “you 
can talk of your New York World, Chicago Tribune, Detroit Free Press, and all the rest of the 
leading journals of the States but this one paper beats them all […] nobody ever misses one word 
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of what it has to say”.25 There is evidence of widespread Sentinel readership; many poems were 
originally published in the paper and soldiers then transcribed them into their diaries. Published 
under the auspices of DeWitt C. Poole, an ardent anti-Bolshevist, the Sentinel also printed anti-
Bolshevik and anti-radical propaganda. Over the course of 25 issues the paper called the 
Bolsheviks “radical” and “violent”, praised the Siberian and North Russia provisional 
governments by featuring letters from President Tchaikovsky of Provincial Government of North 
Russia, spread fear-mongering tales of the Bolshevik regime with headlines such as “Dog Meat 
Diet in Bolshevik Russia; Refugees From Interior Bring Out Stories of Death, Famine, Terror”, 
and even ran stories regarding moderate labor advocate Samuel Gompers on why radical labor 
parties were malevolent.26 As the chief media inlet for the AEFNR, the paper had influence with 
the men and used it to pursue anti-radical anti-labor ends. The Sentinel was the most significant 
American propaganda noted by the AEFNR. Domestic non-propaganda materials had a distinct 
impact as well. 
 News from home had a profoundly deleterious effect on morale. This domestic media 
contained denunciations of the expedition, information about domestic leftwing movements and 
characters like Eugene Debs, stories of their comrades returning from France, and coverage of the 
Congressional outcry against the intervention. These non-propaganda materials had an 
unmistakable impact on AEFNR soldiers’ perceptions of the intervention’s motivations. While 
soldier correspondences sent back to the United States were heavily censored, letters from home 
went unregulated. Corpl. Cleo Colburn wrote in his diary about the information flowing both 
ways: “Clippings from Detroit papers came in stating that the home folks were unsatisfied with the 
conditions of American troops in Russia. Lieutenant Fistler up for court martial for sending news 
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concerning conditions in Russia, which was forbidden”.27 The newspapers had an especially 
pronounced effect as the men accepted American newspapers’ credibility, especially with those of 
their home towns. 
 News of domestic confusion concerning the intervention only furthered the Polar Bears’ 
suspicions over their role in Russia. In an April letter, Lt. Keith Chriswell of “F” Company 
summarized the AEFNR’s awareness of the controversy over poor conditions in Russia: “I see the 
people in the states are pretty wild because we do not come back and I hope they do something 
pretty soon. and [sic] the clippings that I saw in the papers from the states about us here are 
true”.28 Pvt. Kenneth Skellenger reinforced Chriswell in his diary: “we have heard about Detroit 
yelling about 339 in Russia”.29 Such news added tension to the already questionable role of the 
AEFNR. Colburn, in an article concerning the purported “I” Co. mutiny, wrote that his men had 
“received copies of the speech of Senator Hiram Johnson, of California, asking why the troops 
were in Russia, and had received also newspaper clippings asking the same question, and letters 
from their parents asking why the men themselves did not ask”.30 Officers claimed that these 
articles increased confusion and unrest among the soldiers: “press articles and the roars of certain 
congressmen […] that filtered in through the mails to our front line campfires […] caused trouble 
and heart-burnings among the men. It seems incredible how much of it the men fell for”.31 Some 
American newspapers unknowingly reinforced Bolshevik propaganda with incorrect reports: “The 
Americans only laughed at Bolshevik propaganda which they clearly saw through […] But when a 
man's own home paper printed the same story of the million men advancing on Archangel with 
bloody bayonets fixed […] the doughboy's spirit was depressed”.32 Other domestic articles, 
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regarding the Industrial Workers of the World movement and radical figures like Eugene Debs and 
Victor Berger, also had demoralizing consequences. 
 Several officers grimly noted the information exchange regarding domestic Bolshevik-
sympathizing groups to the soldiers in Russia as these materials presented the AEFNR with an 
increasingly complex situation. Some papers glorified left-wing movements and argued that the 
Bolsheviks were allies of a global labor movement. Such coverage offered enlisted men, most of 
whom were working class, an anti-intervention viewpoint and contended that they were fighting a 
pro-working class revolution. Lt. Costello remembered, shortly after returning home, that the 
soldiers’ mail “carried lengthy reports of the speeches of Victor Berger and Eugene V. Debs and 
even more radical persons”.33 Costello continued to portray the divisive nature of such mail:  
On September 29, 1918, for instance, when Americans were giving their lives for a cause 
which they at least didn't understand, Americans who were fighting because they actually 
believed they were preventing Germany establishing a submarine base on the White sea, 
Debs, so the newspapers from our home city told us, was in Detroit delivering a speech 
telling of the wonderful work of the Russian brethren-the very men who were taking 
American lives […] Debs was praising in this speech, which was widely published in the 
locality where most of the 339th men had their homes, the so-called workingmen of 
Russia. […] Didn't he know that American workingmen were being killed and in some 
instances tortured by these so-called brethren in Russia? […] it was difficult for us, away 
up there in isolated and frozen swamps and dense forests, to realize how such a thing as 
permitting Debs to speak as he did was possible […] If men were struck by any 
propaganda in North Russia it was the dilly-dallying tactics of people responsible for 
allowing such as Debs and Berger to run rampant in our own "God's country" that was to 
blame.34 
 
Several officers stated that these materials had more serious effects than British or Russian 
propaganda. Lt. Costello even claimed that “newspaper items from home” induced the “sort of fit 
of group hysteria” that caused the potential “I” Co. mutiny in March 1919.35  
These “yellow articles, which appeared in United States papers and magazines which call 
themselves reputable and which were mailed to the forces in North Russia” further confused the 
ordinary American soldier who was already trying to make sense of a complex political and 
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ideological situation without much guidance from the American government.36 The American 
media and the Sentinel, trusted sources of information, greatly influenced the AEFNR. While the 
Sentinel offered a vehement anti-Bolshevik perspective, domestic materials countered its claims. 
The controversy over the expedition in this domestic media eroded the Americans’ dwindling faith 
in the intervention and accentuated their confusion over the situation. As such, demoralizing 
American literature played a key role in the moral crisis. 
Bolshevik Propaganda in Russia 
 Bolshevik disinformation bombarded American soldiers in North Russia constantly. Smele 
argued that the Bolsheviks honed these skills during the Civil War: “propaganda – especially on 
the Red side – became an art”.37 During 1918 and 1919 the Bolsheviks experimented on American 
soldiers with a variety of materials to some success. The methods and efficacy of this propaganda 
can be broken into pre and post-Armistice stages. Just as the Red troops were less organized and 
efficient early on, so too was their propaganda. 
 After receiving news of the intervention, the communists had retreated from Archangel, 
but not without leaving spies and agents to spread desired messages. Unlike on the Western front 
where trenches defined the front lines, vast swampy expanses with few patrols or trenches 
characterized the fighting in North Russia, leaving a large unsecured border between the Allies 
and Bolsheviks.38 Lt. Primm noted that, “consequently there was always in Archangel and 
scattered throughout the north a dangerously large number of enemy sympathizers and active 
agents. Although some of these were apprehended almost daily, the facilities of the General Staff 
for this work were so slender that there was a constant feeling of great insecurity”.39 Early 
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Bolshevik propaganda consisted mostly of stories and dropped leaflets.40 Pre-Armistice Bolshevik 
propaganda had less varied forms and a consistent message as well. 
Initially, Bolshevik propaganda inspired fear in the Allied troops.41 This method coincided 
with British disinformation by also portraying the Reds as a mercilessly violent fighting force. 
While the British tried to use such sentiment to garner fighting prowess, the Bolsheviks desired 
the opposite. Hoping to strike fear in their enemy, the Bolsheviks left “leaflets aimed at terrifying 
Allied soldiers and undermining morale,” through tales of torture and mutilation.42 Antony 
Lockley, a writer for History Today, noted that Bolshevik propaganda took more forms, improved 
in efficacy, and reoriented its message to match Allied grievances in the post-Armistice period.43 
After November 11, the Americans noticed altered enemy propaganda. On Armistice Day 
itself, the Bolsheviks launched a massive offensive on the Dvina River front, near Toulgas.44 
While the offensive did not drastically change the military balance, it reminded the Americans 
“that they were still fighting while the rest of their comrades in Europe were at peace”.45 Pvt. 
Edwin Arkins, in an unfinished poem, reflected this sentiment: “This is the night of the Armistice; 
/ The World has gone mad with delight. / Naught for us but misery mid snow and ice / With 
nothing but fighting in sight”.46 After the Armistice, the Bolsheviks identified preexisting tensions 
among the Allied forces. 
Bolshevik propaganda became more influential after the Armistice as its content shifted 
from mutilation stories to instead address post-Armistice anxieties.47 Bolshevik writers realized 
three characteristics of the Allied troops and reoriented their propaganda as such. Firstly, the 
ceasefire annulled labeling North Russia as a sideshow of WWI and Allied military leaders had 
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not provided their men with reasoning for their continued presence into the harsh winter months. 
A report from Capt. Hugh S. Martin summarized the predicament:  
Before the signing of the armistice it was easy to say that we were fighting the allies of 
Germany. After the armistice, however – when the heaviest fighting of the North Russia 
campaign took place – we were left in the embarrassing attitude of trying to interpret the 
policies of our respective governments so as to justify our military activities in Russia […] 
The Bolsheviks lost no opportunity to take advantage of this state of mind and flooded us 
with propaganda in the language of the particular unit to which it was directed, in which 
they asked our soldiers these very questions.48 
 
The Armistice weighed on the AEFNR and the Bolsheviks capitalized on the situation by never 
letting the men forget it: “Bolsheviki almost daily tried out their post-armistice propaganda”.49  
Secondly, tensions between the working class enlisted men and their upper-class officers 
were poor. In a speculative essay written in April 1919, Sgt. Roger Clark claimed that “the gilded 
aristocracy of British and American officers in particular” eroded morale.50 The Bolsheviks 
acknowledged this sentiment, as “hierarchy and subordination chafed against ingrained American 
values of equality and individualism”, and used these anxieties to prod at class tensions.51 Lastly, 
most enlisted men were working class. The fact that working class Americans were in Russia, 
fighting Russian workers and peasants in a military intervention decided upon by wealthy and 
powerful Americans, played into the Bolshevik narrative. Some soldiers openly stated their 
backgrounds, like Sgt. Silver Parrish, who viewed the Russian situation while “being a working 
man my self [sic]”.52 The occupational knowledge section of ordinary troops’ enlistment records 
usually stated roles such as “laborer”, “farmer”, or similar skill-level jobs like “warehouse 
worker” and reinforce the working class character of the men.53 Kennedy wrote of how military 
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intelligence testers were “unsettled by the meager educational background of the recruits” as well, 
confirming the socioeconomic composition of AEFNR enlisted men.54 
The directing of propaganda towards working class troops is especially evident in a 
publication which several Americans mention: an English-language paper published in Moscow 
named The Call.55 Kenez specifically mentioned The Call, describing how the Bolsheviks “were 
particularly interested in reaching the soldiers of the interventionist armies,” and claimed that 
Allied soldiers “were willing listeners” to such propaganda.56 The December 7, 1918 edition of 
The Call addressed its target audience immediately: “Of the workers and peasants of Russia, to 
their English speaking fellow workers”.57 The publication gave a rendition of world events while 
emphasizing an upcoming global proletariat revolution. The paper denounced the bourgeoisie, 
sometimes by utilizing humor. For example, one section told a comical fable of J.P. Morgan, John 
D. Rockefeller, and an undefined member of the Rothschild family eating “common people” as 
food.58 The No.13 edition called upon Allied soldiers to desert: “the most hearty welcome of all to 
those English and American soldiers, who have the courage to leave the armies of their Imperialist 
warlords and come over to the side of the Russian labour Republic”.59 Pvt. Walter McKenzie 
brought back an issue of the paper, and although his diary does not address it, the fact that he 
chose to bring the paper home reflected some degree of interest.  
Other Bolshevik propaganda appealed to the soldiers’ emotions and ethnic backgrounds. 
“It is the capitalist governments of your countries, who compel you to undergo the horrors of war, 
and who keep you away from your loved ones who are yearning for your return,” claimed one 
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pamphlet.60 Bolshevik propaganda attempted to incite ethnic mutinies amongst the Americans of 
Russian descent. One article described its complexity and targeting after the Armistice: “This isn’t 
the old propaganda that the Russians tried. They would leave printed posters tied to the trees 
whenever they retreated. These called upon the Americans of Russian descent to rebel. But they 
only served to make the American Russians more bitter toward the “Bolos””.61 Papers directed 
American soldiers to disobey officers, further distribute the propaganda, and educated them about 
the origins and purported successes of communist revolution.62 The propaganda brought 
simmering issues out into the open, as no commanders had given American soldiers a concrete 
reason for their presence. While the content did not vary largely, the dissemination methods did. 
The Bolsheviks used more methods and increased materials to propagandize the Allied 
soldiers after the ceasefire in France. The dropped pamphlet approaches continued post-Armistice 
but increased in ferocity: “[Bolshevik] propaganda was hurled at us with a force as great as their 
shells and their bullets. Trains of box cars actually loaded with propaganda matter were sent to the 
front lines. Trails were strewn with the stuff at night. We found it scattered on the ground, hanging 
to the branches of trees”.63 The fact that the Bolsheviks placed such an emphasis on propaganda, 
during a time when Kenez noted a severe paper shortage in Russia, showed its importance to the 
Bolsheviks and hints at its efficacy.64  
Soldiers described alternative Bolshevik approaches as well. The Red troops preached 
communist ideology and constructed large bulletin boards to spread their message across the front 
lines. Sgt. Gordon Smith wrote an anecdote of one Bolshevik method: “Bolo came down to bridge 
under white flag and gave us a lecture on Bolshevism, and said they did not want to fight the 
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Americans”.65 Pvt. McKenzie, who had kept a copy of The Call, also kept a Bolshevik pamphlet. 
The pamphlet was an English version of the “Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet 
Republic”, published in Moscow in 1918 and intended to educate English readers with a rosy 
vision of Bolshevism.66 In some cases propaganda exchanges went both ways. Corporal James 
Sibley recorded that his “Capt. Had an interview with the Bolos officers on the bridge and gave 
them some propaganda, they also gave us some”.67 One of the most peculiar attempts to sway 
Allied morale was the POW experience. 
Contrary to the messages in early propaganda, the Bolsheviks treated Allied prisoners 
extremely well, providing good accommodations while attempting to indoctrinate them with 
ideology. On one occasion, an Irish priest captured behind enemy lines was permitted to return 
after attending lessons on communism in Moscow and agreeing to pass along pamphlets.68 Several 
Americans experienced longer prisoner tenures, but the “prisoner” title barely recreates the 
experience. In a description of his POW experience, George Albers remembered how “the Reds 
tried their best to make [them] comfortable”.69 While the POWs did partake in forced labor, they 
were given free reign of Moscow before a 9 p.m. curfew. Albers and his fellow POWs attended 
weekly lectures on Bolshevism, incentivized by bountiful meals as a reward for listening.70 Pvt. 
Earl Fulcher was also captured and, in a statement of his experience, remarked that “we received 
enough to eat and were not mistreated in any way […] the interpreters told us that that they did not 
blame the soldiers in the Allied Armies for being up here”.71 American POWs had firsthand 
impressions of the Bolshevik regime and were taught Bolshevik ideology. 
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Bolshevik propaganda, aimed at the English-speaking armies, took a variety of forms 
which shifted throughout the intervention. From pamphlets to lectures across the front lines to 
attempts to indoctrinate POWs, the Bolsheviks tried a plethora of tactics during the Civil War 
years. The “most vicious and deadly of all the enemy weapons--Bolshevik Propaganda” improved 
in effectiveness after the Armistice, concretely altering AEFNR morale in the second stage of the 
expedition.72 Some veterans speculated that the propaganda was so well targeted that the “Bolos 
must have known something of our unwarlike and dissatisfied state of mind”.73 The fact that 
Americans were exposed to such propaganda is known, but the efficacy of such propaganda is 
nuanced and unexplored. 
American interpretations of Bolshevik propaganda varied widely by rank due to 
differences in education and socioeconomic backgrounds. Almost unanimously, officers 
disregarded the propaganda and assumed their men could do the same. The views of enlisted men 
were more subtle. Many did not record Bolshevik propaganda interactions, yet those who did 
called it a powerful tool against Allied morale. Unlike officer statements, the official reports from 
Archangel noted the pervasiveness of Bolshevik propaganda. Scores of soldiers read the 
propaganda and wrote about it.74 By using enlisted men and official documents, the influence of 
post-Armistice Bolshevik propaganda is clear: it amplified preexisting poor conditions such as the 
cold, military hierarchy, and the ceasefire. While the AEFNR records show that Bolshevik 
propaganda adversely impacted American morale, the documents do not imply ideological 
acceptance of Bolshevism.  
The officers of the AEFNR universally denounced Bolshevism. Lt. Costello wrote of the 
ideology in hardline terms, stating that “Bolshevism today [is] the chief menace to the world-a 
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menace not alone from a military standpoint, not alone from the standpoint of a threatened social 
and political order, but from the standpoint of the very safety of humanity itself”.75 Lt. Primm and 
Lt. Cudahy agreed with Costello, and Primm wrote that “Relations with [Bolshevism] were not 
complicated, but were sufficient to indicate to thoughtful minds the menace possibly involved to 
world peace and to civilization itself”.76 Some officers, like Capt. Moore, Lt. Mead, and Lt. Jahns, 
had less aggressive stances: “We say candidly that we think Bolshevism is a failure. But we do not 
condemn everyone else who differs with us,” still, “we want nothing to do with the Bolo agitator 
in this country who would make another Russia of the United States”.77 AEFNR officers 
expressed a mindset opposing Bolshevism with varied ferociousness. The officers were 
unanimous in denying propaganda’s influence on their men.78 
 Officers claimed that the AEFNR was immune to propaganda, sometimes by making 
arguments that reflected ignorance about the true composition of the men. Unlike the soldier 
diaries, many of the officer records were written in the year following their withdrawal from 
Russia. The climate in which these materials were produced, the Red Scare, may have pushed the 
writers to the extreme, as Lt. Costello claimed: “they are all united on one point. They hate 
Bolshevism and all that it stands for”.79 Costello also highlighted the role of religious objection: “I 
personally have listened to a dozen conversations among the enlisted men and […] each of these 
conversations bewailed the fact that the forces of religion in the western world little realized that 
this movement called Bolshevism was reaching out at the heart of Christianity”.80 Moore, Mead, 
and Jahns noted the same, remembering that “Soldiers were quick to punch holes in any 
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propaganda”.81 Some argued that a lack of English-language materials lessened potential effects of 
Bolshevik propaganda. Lt. Primm specifically noted the language barrier:  
There was plenty of propaganda all through North Russia, but most of it was in Russian. 
That which was translated into English impressed the Americans chiefly by its bombastic 
exaggeration and its simplicity, so that they laughed at it. It is doubtful if any Bolshevik 
propaganda, which came north from central Russia, had the slightest effect on American 
troops or in any way was accountable for any thought, statement or action by American 
soldiers, which could be criticized.82 
 
The official military reports and cables tell a different story regarding the efficacy of Bolshevik 
propaganda. 
Contrary to Primm’s claim, many AEFNR soldiers were of Slavic ethnicity and this 
became a contentious point regarding Bolshevik propaganda.83 Early on in the campaign, General 
Ironside applauded the Americans for their bilingual abilities, making the case that the large 
amounts of ethnic Russians and Poles from Detroit gave troops ample interpreters.84 In a later 
cable Ironside retracted this sentiment, instead arguing that Russian-Americans were prone to 
Bolshevik propaganda and disseminated English translations amongst peers.85 Capt. Prince 
reported the opposite, claiming that there “is absolutely no evidence to prove that foreign born 
soldiers are apt to make trouble, to the contrary in most cases […] the most persistent knockers 
and trouble makers have been native born citizens”.86 Still, Prince and Ironside were in agreement 
– trouble was afoot in the AEFNR. Overall, the commanding officers in Archangel provided more 
realistic assessments of the impact of propaganda on enlisted men than their officers at the front. 
Many official reports directly contradict the statements from officers at the front. 
 The military leadership in Archangel recognized Bolshevik propaganda as a realistic tool 
of psychological warfare but did not observe an ideological acceptance of Bolshevism among the 
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men. A February 1919 report from Archangel stated that “the effects of in some cases of 
Bolshevik propaganda have produced a low state of morale in the American forces”.87 A separate 
report by Capt. Eugene Prince found that a “very large amount of trouble has to be credited to the 
effects of the Bolshevik propaganda, particularly to the booklets […] and the copies of the “Call” 
the bolshevick [sic] propaganda newspaper”.88 Even hardliner Lt. Primm contradicted himself and 
noted the influential abilities of the propaganda concerning POWs: “only the small number of 
such prisoners prevented that form of propaganda from becoming powerful in favorably 
influencing the general American attitude toward Bolshevism”.89 As such, the officer literature 
published during the Red Scare incorrectly downplays the efficacy of Bolshevik propaganda. 
American soldiers’ views regarding Bolshevism are largely missing from the record but 
the few entries which exist range widely. Anti-Bolshevik opinions comprised one end of the 
enlisted man and NCO spectrum. Ernest Andrews, in a March 1919 letter to his family, pledged to 
continue to “fight the “bolos” if they try to gain a foothold at home”.90 However, in the same 
letter, Andrews acknowledged the quality of the propaganda: “their propaganda […] makes fools 
of some you could not call ignorant”.91 Corpl. Hugo Salchow, in an interview conducted in 1971, 
recalled: “I don’t think that [Bolshevism] was considered a threat to the American system  […] 
But we knew pretty well that Communism wasn’t something that we would like to live with”.92 As 
such, several AEFNR men professed anti-Bolshevik opinions while acknowledging the efficacy of 
their propaganda. 
Other troops expressed a general ambivalence towards the Bolsheviks. Sgt. Clark wrote 
that “in Northern Russia the Bolshevik appears merely as a half-starved and not unlikeable fellow 
                                                
87 Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Situation Reports on the Efficiency and Morale of the AER, North Russia, Dec 1918-
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88 Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Reports on the Morale of the AEF, North Russia, by Capts Jacob A Harzfeld and 
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91 
who frankly disavows any quarrel with America” and that “there is no great hatred for the 
Bolsheviki in the rank and file of the American army”.93 During the American evacuation, Sgt. 
Gordon Smith rooted for the Bolsheviks due to his greater hatred of the British despite denouncing 
the Reds several weeks earlier: “Our new relief who came up here to finish the job had to give up 
Toulgas to the Bolos yesterday. English will be driven back into the White Sea soon. Hurrah! I 
hope so”.94 Only a few soldiers expressed radical sentiments. 
Although rare, some soldiers articulated pro-Bolshevik beliefs. Pvt. Kenneth Skellenger, in 
the back of his diary, wrote a note “To the Bolshevik soldiers” in March of 1919. Skellenger wrote 
that “We would join hands with you to down crowned heads. It is all for the majority of human 
beings” as “We U.S. soldiers hear many stories about the inhuman “Bolo” but we do not believe 
all we hear”.95 The letter ends with a nearly mutinous request: “We won’t make an attact [sic] on 
you. If you wait 2 ½ months we will be out of Russia”.96 A petition circulated “B” Company in 
February 1919 that demanded an end to patrols.97 Sgt. Silver Parrish, the NCO behind the almost-
mutinous resolution, sympathized with the Bolshevik cause and wrote in his diary: “I am 9/10 
Bolo my self and they all call me the Bolos leader and my platoone [sic] the Bolos platoone 
because every man in my platoone signed that [document]”.98 Propaganda cannot be the sole cause 
of Parrish’s leanings, however. In one of his first entries upon arrival in Russia, he wrote of his 
distaste for the slang term “bolo”, for “I know better they are [working] men trying to through 
[sic] off the yoke of Capitalism”.99 Also, while Parrish harbored communist feelings, his military 
                                                
93 BHL: Clark, “What Ails the AEFNR?”, 7. 
94 BHL: Smith, “Diary”, 17. 
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record was impressive amongst sergeants in North Russia, earning him military decorations and 
respect.100  
Analyses of enlisted men’s records suggest that their perceptions of the Bolsheviks were 
varied, yet the majority did not identify with the goal of eradicating Bolshevism. Kenneth Adams, 
who covered the AEFNR for the Chicago Tribune, accurately summarized the aggregate feeling: 
“These men who were hemmed in all Winter, ignorant of why they were fighting, close to the 
founts of Bolshevik propaganda […] They feel it is a sort of unlawlessness in which they are not 
concerned in Russia but in which they would be patriotically concerned in Detroit or Chicago”.101 
The AEFNR records support a general ambivalence toward Bolshevism in Russia but refute a 
widespread acceptance of Bolshevik ideology. Willett, who largely ignored the propaganda aspect 
of the AEFNR experience, still confirmed that the “Canadians and Americans often expressed 
sympathy for, and even a certain closeness to, the Bolsheviks”.102 While enlisted men did not 
widely support the Bolshevik cause, official military reports and newspapers correctly connected 
Bolshevik propaganda to collapsing American morale.  
Some reports and American newspaper articles raised the question of Bolshevik 
propaganda’s connection to the mutinous events in “I” Company in March 1919. The “mutiny” 
was attributed to Bolshevik propaganda, as an official “dispatch states that it is worthy of note that 
the questions that were put to the officers by the men were identical with those that the Bolsheviki 
leaflets advised them to put to them”.103 Prominent newspapers ran with the claim. An April 1919 
New York Times article detailed: “Official reports to the War Department, made public today […] 
show that the mutiny among the American troops at Archangel was directly due to propaganda 
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circulated among the men by Bolshevist sympathizers”.104 Despite the relabeling of the mutiny 
later on, the report released by General Peyton C. March (Army Chief of Staff) and the subsequent 
media outcry highlighted the Bolshevik propaganda’s impact. 
The men of the 339th were eager to portray the incident as a misunderstanding and 
dismissed the role of Bolshevik disinformation. A Chicago Tribune correspondent present in 
Russia at the time, Frazier Hunt, flatly rejected the role of propaganda on the “mutiny” upon 
returning home: “certainly Bolshevist propaganda had nothing to do with it”.105 While no soldiers 
were court martialed, soldiers initially disobeyed a direct order and were accused of being 
influenced to do so by propaganda. The fact that the question was raised reflected the 
pervasiveness of the Bolshevik propaganda. 
Disinformation was an essential theme of the AEFNR experience. Propaganda and 
American media were catalysts of deteriorating morale and mutinous activity after the ceasefire in 
Europe. British propaganda exacerbated Anglo-American enmity while encouraging violent 
treatment of enemy POWs. A comprehensive view of the enlisted men’s records suggests that the 
Bolshevik propaganda aided, to some degree, in the erosion of American morale after the 
Armistice. The Bolshevik propaganda did not fabricate new worries but prodded the existing 
qualms analyzed in Chapters One and Two. These qualms went unaddressed by American military 
leadership and AEFNR officers, allowing the questions posed by Bolshevik propaganda to take 
root.106 Domestic American materials which found their way to the front lines had the most 
pronounced impact, as soldiers were more likely to believe a hometown paper. This media brought 
news of the domestic controversy over the intervention to the AEFNR and hurt morale by 
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verifying the men’s confusion. Ironically, the American press had the largest negative effect on the 
morale of the AEFNR.  
The AEFNR experience did not end after boarding the Menominee and departing for Brest, 
France, and later the United States. They returned home to the Red Scare United States with new 
ideas and changed perceptions, especially on the subjects of Russia, Bolshevism, and America’s 
role in the world.  
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Conclusion 
Returning Home 
 
Life will always be a crazy thing to the soldier of North Russia; the color and the taste of living 
have gone from the soldier of North Russia; and the glory of youth has forever gone from him1 
-Lt. John Cudahy 
 
As morale deteriorated in Russia, domestic pressures mounted to bring the soldiers home. Despite 
being forbidden to send news of the situation in North Russia back to the United States, some 
avoided censorship and alerted the Detroit papers of conditions.2 Citizens related to the soldiers 
sent a document to Congress in February to “petition for the withdrawal of the American soldiers 
from the entire country of North Russian […] or failing this, we urge that they be properly housed, 
fed, clothed, munitioned, and given proper hospital facilities”.3 State representatives from the 
Midwest led by Wisconsin Governor E. L. Philipp, Michigan Governor Robert Sleeper, Wisconsin 
Senator Robert La Follette, and California Senator Hiram Johnson sued for an end to the conflict – 
an expedition in a sovereign country which Congress had not declared war on.4 Wilson, who had 
little enthusiasm for the expedition in the first place, did not need persuading.  
By February 1919 the American government had decided upon a withdrawal as early as 
weather would permit.5 Colonel Stewart circulated a memo on April 9 that announced the 
withdrawal and commended the AEFNR on faring through compromising conditions: “the 
hardships of service under Arctic conditions is well recognized”.6 Still, even as the AEFNR 
mobilized toward Archangel, not all of the men rejoiced. Some on the Onega and Dvina fronts 
continued to fight until June and, when relieved by White Russians, despaired in the lack of 
                                                
1 Cudahy, 29 
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4 Rhodes, 102. 
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results: “The Bolos attacked Tolgas this morning. A White Russian Regiment was stationed there 
and they plotted with the Bolos and deliberately gave up the town […] Six months of hard work 
gone to the devil”.7 Sgt. Smith too lamented the late fighting: “Our government promised to get us 
out of here by the 1st of June but we are still on the front line”.8 Despite Douma and Smith’s 
worries, they pulled back to Archangel to join their peers soon after.  
In June, troops filtered in from the various fronts of the Archangel area as the Polar Bears 
assembled in Economia to prepare for the journey home. The Doughboys spent several nights 
packing by day and playing baseball in the midnight sun on the sandy banks of the island.9 In mid-
June the vast majority of men departed aboard the Menominee or the Porto (Photograph C.i). They 
left with some additions: ample medals bestowed by the British military and eight Russian 
brides.10 Even during the jubilant departure the Anglo-American antagonism continued to stir. 
According to Rhodes, General Richardson “sensed condescending overtones of British 
imperialism” in the large amount of bestowed awards.11 During their evacuation from North 
Russia the Americans met incoming British reinforcements who verbally mocked their fighting 
spirit.12 Before departure “incipient melees arose in the streets of Archangel” between British and 
Americans troops.13 While aboard the Menominee and docked at Kola, a “battle of words and coal 
occure[ed] between yanks and british”, resulting in an American being “hit by bottle thrown from 
opposite [British] ship”.14 Despite enduring hostility, the AEFNR rejoiced during the passage to 
Brest, France where after a brief stay “back in civilization” they again departed for the United 
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States via Boston or New York.15 The men complained little about the continually awful 
conditions aboard the transports.  
The men celebrated as they arrived in the United States. Clarence Scheu explained the 
feeling of the men upon seeing Boston harbor from SS President Grant: “sight Revere beach […] 
a mighty cheer goes up from the ship, its all over now, were [sic] home”.16 Corpl. Fred Kooyers 
travelled on a different ship, the Von Steuben, and described the scene upon landing in New York: 
“About 4A.M. we were met by a party from Detroit. They had a band with them followed us into 
the harbor and furnished music all the way to the dock”.17 The AEFNR returned to Michigan, and 
even the non-locals were treated “as good as the home people”.18 The men were discharged and 
free to continue their prewar lives by late July. 
 The story of the Polar Bears did not end in July 1919, however. The veterans returned 
home to muted celebrations due to the controversy surrounding the failed expedition. A Grand 
Rapids paper explained that “there is an apparent desire among officials here to get the outfit 
demobilized as quickly and quietly as possible; particularly it appears they do not relish the idea of 
the regiment being discussed”.19 Despite largescale ignorance of the AEFNR’s return in the United 
States, the Detroit area rejoiced. Many men were home for July Fourth celebrations and the 339th 
paraded around the area (Photograph C.ii).20 Still, the widespread dismissal of the AEFNR’s 
return, who “returned home almost unnoticed, forgotten” left some disheartened.21 
 The AEFNR also returned to a different country than the one they had left in 1918. The 
atmosphere had turned from patriotic to a toxic manhunt for radicals and anyone who chose to 
criticize the United States, a period referred to as the Red Scare. As Robert K. Murray described, 
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“the year 1919, rather than being remembered for its great hopes and its promise, remains on the 
pages of American history as one of the most futile and tragic”.22 Detroit, the home of the 339th 
and also a center for the IWW, experienced large government raids with roughly 800 suspected 
leftwing sympathizers imprisoned under harsh accommodations for days.23 The men of the 339th 
returned during the height of the Red Scare after prolonged exposure to Bolshevism, often in the 
form of propaganda.  
After months of contact with Bolsheviks, many of the AEFNR had strong feelings about 
Bolshevism in a domestic setting. Veteran officers Moore, Mead, and Jahns wrote a chapter on the 
subject in their 1920 book because “the writers have an idea that the veterans of the North Russia 
Expedition would like a short, up-to-date chapter on Bolshevism”.24 The officers commented on 
the Red Scare climate: 
In Russia, as in America, many false accusations and false assumptions are made. We now 
know that of certainty the Bolshevik, or Communistic party of Russia was aided by like-
minded people in America […] but we became rather hysterical in 1919 over those 
I.W.W.-Red outbursts, and very nearly let the conflict between Red propaganda and anti-
Red propaganda upset our best traditions of toleration, of free speech, and of free press.25 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, most officer documents were published during the Red Scare and the 
anti-radical sentiment in 1919 may have skewed their perceptions of the expedition. Lt. John A. 
Commons elaborated, writing that the experience “made damn good Americans out of our soldiers 
[…] And, if you should care for a very exciting five minutes at any time, just mention Bolshevik 
or I.W.W. to a member of the 339th”.26 Despite an overwhelming postwar condemnation of 
Bolshevism by AEFNR officers, no Bentley records captured the opinions of veteran enlisted men. 
While the Bentley collection largely ends after the AEFNR’s 1919 return, some documents 
illustrate the men’s longstanding interest in Russia and their communal experience. 
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 AEFNR veterans founded the Polar Bear Association in 1922 and kept in touch after the 
war. The “Constitution and By-Laws of the Polar Bear Association” stated that its goals were “to 
preserve and strengthen comradeship amongst its members” and “to perpetuate the history of our 
expedition and the memory of our dead” (Photograph C.iii).27 Many AEFNR members attended 
Polar Bear Association gatherings to keep in touch (Photograph C.iv). Some remained friends 
through correspondence, oftentimes commenting on matters in Russia. In a 1920 letter from Sgt. 
Thomas Kernan to Sgt. Trombley, Kernan remarked: “I was reading in the paper where Mr. Bolo 
has taken Archangel and Murmansk and it makes me mad enough to fight to think of the men we 
lost and for no purpose”.28 The Polar Bear Association printed annual materials and eulogized 
deceased members. A 2014 Collections article, published by Bentley, noted that “another goal [of 
the Association], if not explicitly written in the charter, was to recover the bodies of American 
soldiers lost on the Russian battlefield”.29 
The continued comradeship fostered by the Polar Bear Association spurred a 1929 trip to 
the Soviet Union to recover AEFNR bodies. Five veterans made the trip which was heavily 
documented by the Polar Bear Association and the American media.30 In 1965 veteran Michael 
Macalla, who had joined the 1929 trip, commented on the enduring confusion among veterans: 
“this is the least that those living who survived the campaign could do for those buddies who made 
the supreme sacrifice for a cause they never did understand”.31 The publicized 1929 trip 
repatriated eighty-four deceased Polar Bears, most of whom were buried in the Polar Bear Plot of 
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the White Chapel Memorial cemetery in Troy, Michigan.32 Memorials in Troy continue to this day, 
with the most recent service in May 2011 and another planned for 2017 (Photograph C.v).33  
The Polar Bear Association sought to memorialize the men of the AEFNR who did not 
return from Russia. Another goal was to educate people about the expedition. This desire was 
apparent in a 1924 Polar Bear Association pamphlet, with the opening title “Who Are the Polar 
Bears and the 310th Engineers?”. The article described the paradoxical nature of the AEFNR in a 
text that is characteristic of twentieth-century American military interventions with unclear 
strategic purposes:  
[The] causes for warring on Russians have never been made clear to anyone – much less to 
American soldiers. But war we did in an intensive bitter struggle about Archangel that 
reads like a melodrama […] If one looks for heroism and moral grandeur, and noble self-
negation, then there is much of victory in the campaign of North Russia. If one thinks of 
burning villages – sending homeless [Russian peasants] adrift on Arctic snows, butchering 
people with whom we had no quarrel, deserting a loyal generous ally when the battle was at 
its height […] then there is naught but burning shame in the chapter of North Russia. The 
only precedent for comparison is the war with Mexico.34 
 
The lingering ambivalence displayed in the Polar Bear Association materials illustrated how 
AEFNR veterans, years later, still struggled to define their own soldier experience. They had 
fought bravely in brutal conditions against a better-equipped enemy. Allied atrocities, enduring 
confusion over why they had fought the Bolsheviks, and the military failure of the expedition still 
tinged their memories. Propaganda and domestic media had amplified the already poor conditions 
and helped collapse morale. The effects of the AEFNR’s morale crisis were still apparent five 
years later in this ambivalent text. Ultimately, the soldier experience still burned bright in the 
memories of the AEFNR after they departed Russia in 1919, and the decades of Polar Bear 
Association documents reflect this.  
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 By 1924, members of the Polar Bear Association already placed the North Russian 
intervention in the category of twentieth century American interventions. By comparing it to the 
military mission in Mexico, the Polar Bear Association made a connection decades before the 
conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East further completed the picture. The AEFNR 
experience is an early and obscure case study in the complex intervention subgenre of twentieth 
century American soldier experiences.  
 The Polar Bears left for Russia in 1918 with high hopes for the war in France. They were 
not mistaken in this belief; Kennedy quoted an American soldier in France who “never enjoyed 
life as much as I have since I have been over here” to illustrate how “the season and the terrain 
[and] the lateness and the brevity of American belligerency” endowed many in the AEF with a 
“cheerful attitude”.35 Neither the weather, terrain, nor length of service in Russia benefited the 
AEFNR like their counterparts in France. The ill-fated trip from England to Russia, struck by the 
Spanish Flu and subsequent health and supply issues, cast an ominous tone over the early months. 
The men experienced brutal violence with little sleep or food. Their changed perspectives, as 
many came to admire Russian civilians, was a silver lining. Ultimately, because of the fervor the 
Great War instilled, morale remained high in the fall compared to the later months. 
 The Armistice fundamentally changed the mindsets of the AEFNR. The soldiers felt 
confused and military leadership did little to alleviate the men’s perplexity. Conditions worsened 
after the Armistice as well: cold weather ended the rainy season but brought new dangers, growing 
animosity between the Allied armies undermined communality and trust, and the Bolsheviks 
coalesced into an intimidating enemy. Despite the efforts of humanitarian organizations like the 
YMCA, the AEFNR’s morale declined until mutinous activity surged. Even as most of the men 
enjoyed baseball games in the midnight sun during the spring retreat, some fought until June. The 
                                                
35 Emery Diary, Aug. 5, 1917, Emery Collection in Kennedy, 212; Kennedy, 215. 
102 
Polar Bear’s story, while relatively unknown, has been described by Benjamin Rhodes, E.M. 
Halliday, and Robert Willett. One key aspect of the AEFNR experience that had not been 
documented to the same degree was the impact of information and disinformation. 
 Propaganda and American media played a significant role in the AEFNR’s psychological 
experience. Despite denials that Bolshevik propaganda caused the precipitous decline in morale, 
the number of documents claiming otherwise illustrated that the materials had influence. While the 
archives do not fully support the claim that Bolshevik propaganda solely instigated mutinous 
activity, the propaganda in conjunction with demoralizing American media impacted morale. The 
erosion of public support for the intervention in the United States seeped over the Russia and 
effectively undermined the already-dwindling confidence in the expedition. 
 The AEFNR fought bravely in a difficult situation with a confusing and misguided 
political purpose. The American intervention in North Russia is a case study of soldiers in a 
twentieth century American intervention. First, the intervention reorients the timeline of American 
missions that lacked a defined political purpose. While Vietnam, the Middle East, and Korea come 
to mind in recent history, the similarly confused intervention in North Russia extends the timeline. 
Second, adding the AEFNR experience to those of more recent interventions illuminates the many 
chronic issues discussed in this thesis. Last, North Russia presents an early instance of enemy 
propaganda and domestic controversy negatively impacting soldiers’ morale. As such, a study of 
the Polar Bears contributes to the growing American soldier experience genre. A new analysis of 
the AEFNR experience, highlighting the pivotal Armistice and emphasizing the role of 
propaganda and American media, adds an unexplored piece to a larger canon.   
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READY TO BOARD THE MENOMINEE AT MURMANSK
A day the men longed to see
LINED UP ON MURMANSK DOCKS
Ready to Board H. M. T. Menominee, July 28, 1919
Photographs 
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Source: John Wilson, The Arctic Antics of the North Russian Transportation Corps of the U.S. Army, Hathi Trust 
Digital Library, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015071183761, 576. 
 
C.ii: “Postcard, Polar Bear units marching” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Walter I. McKenzie Papers. 
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C.iii:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Polar Bears Honor their Heroic Dead”, Detroit Free Press, May 30, 1932 in “Scrapbook 1”, Hugh D. 
McPhail Papers, 30. 
 
C.iv: “Group photograph, Polar Bear Post No. 436, June 23, 1945” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BHL: Walter I. McKenzie Papers. 
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C.v: 2011 Memorial Day service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Grobbel, “The 81st Memorial Day Service”.   
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Appendix 
 
A: Casualties1 
 
  
                                                
1 Historical Files Relating to North Russia, “Memorandums and Reports on Casualties and Disposition of Dead in North Russia, 
1918 and 1919”, 1. 
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